

A paper for the Australian Population Association Conference 2000

"Growth pressure and the consolidation mentality: immigration and the French"

By Sheila Newman

Abstract:

In 1945 France and Australia started out with high immigration policies that set out to supply workers for industrial expansion and to build up the numbers of their nations for defence purposes. Both also began with strong public housing policies.

France continued to house a large proportion of its lower socio-economic strata through public housing, but in Australia in the 1950s the Menzies Government withdrew support from the public housing program, giving private developers and builders almost exclusive domain over the provision of housing in Australia.

According to the ABS, Australia is on course to increase its population by about 50% between the end of the 20th century and the year 2050,¹ when it will still be growing. But France is on a course to stabilise and then decline over the same period, according to INSEE and Eurostat.²

The UN has suggested that France (and the rest of Western Europe) replace its population loss and maintain its age to youth ratio through a massive immigration program.³ A number of prominent Australians think that Australia should do the same.⁴ But the French think this is not relevant since population stabilisation and decline are well accepted prospects there.⁵

How is it that France and Australia have finished up with such different demographic and economic philosophies? Much of the answer may lie in their different approaches to land development planning and housing.

"Growth pressure and the consolidation mentality: immigration and the French"

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WORLD POPULATION, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC POLICIES: EMERGING DIFFERENCES

Several first world countries have semi-explicit population policies based on growth and economies which appear to be based on this population growth, but increases in energy consumption and human population since the Second World War call these population policies into question. This paper concentrates on France and Australia.⁶ The economies of both those countries in 1945 had very similar population growth policies, but in 1974 they began to diverge markedly. The paper attempts to explain why.

Global population doubling time is accelerating. In 1804 the first billion was reached. 123 years later, in 1927, the second billion. Only 33 years later, in 1960, the third billion. Since 1927, over a mere 72 years, world population has tripled. In 1974 it reached four billion, in 1987 it reached five billion, and in 1999 it reached six billion.⁷ It may yet double again. Even if this does not happen, with gains in life expectancy and despite falling total fertility rates, population momentum guarantees continuing increase well into the 21st century. Economic disparities between the "developed" and the "developing" world have dramatically increased since the second world war. And since a series of oil shocks in 1973 and 1978,⁸ the disparities between socio-economic classes have also increased in countries with intensively oil based economies. In these countries, traditional gaps had previously narrowed with the post war boom and industrialisation.⁹ Economic and demographic pressures are causing a growing movement of people seeking better lives to move to richer countries in search of work.¹⁰ The number seeking political asylum is rising. The line between political asylum and economic asylum is blurring as social breakdown accompanies economic breakdown. Conventions developed by the first world countries for determining and processing asylum claims are being overwhelmed and replaced with new strategies.¹¹

At the same time as the poor are pressing against the national borders of the first world, the economies of the first world are actively competing with each other to attract the highly skilled and potential capital investors to their commercial, research, service and development sectors.

In a sort of parallel economy, the black labour market is also seeking to attract another class of immigrant (low-skilled workers, the very class that the national workers want to keep out) to supply labour to those industries that either cannot get local labour or cannot or will not afford the wages it asks for. (Nationals fear open policy towards these kinds of low skilled immigrants will depress wages).¹² Illegal immigrant trafficking is now an industry in itself. People-smuggling is a lucrative business which carries far fewer legal penalties than drug smuggling.

Legal immigration of refugees, family reunion, and potential workers has also become a lucrative international enterprise, one that does not carry the stigma or risks of illegal immigrant trafficking. It too attracts money up front and may at times be as financially exploitative of false hopes.

Some humanitarian groups seek to take in many more refugees than their governments wish to provide for.

In Australia, but not in France, business groups and industries (especially the land development and housing industries) seek greater immigration from any quarter in the belief that a bigger population will mean more consumers, profitable infrastructure expansion, and a bigger economy.¹³

Almost all of these groups are in conflict with other groups to varying degrees in various first world countries, including France and Australia. For instance, in Australia, the groups which seek to attract skilled immigrants are in conflict with local industry associations, like the Australian Medical Association and Actors Equity. In France and Australia the groups which seek to attract illegal immigrants are in conflict with the law and the working classes who sense that their jobs and wages are targeted. The industry that profits by encouraging largely unfounded hopes of legal immigration costs government and tax payers the funding required to process applications and appeals, particularly in Australia.¹⁴ In France and Australia, the humanitarian groups that want more refugees are in conflict with government because of the cost of providing support and infrastructure for humanitarian migrants. Refugees are one of the most costly immigrant groups due to physical and emotional trauma and the difficulty in language and matching skills with local labour markets. In Australia, the business groups which desire expansion and the land development and housing industries which provide the infrastructure for that expansion are in conflict with environmentalists and ecologists. Government also worries about the costs to the environment and of providing infrastructure for continuing expansion.

This tremendous, largely unanticipated rise in migration pressures on first world countries and the economic disparity between the first and third worlds¹⁵ has challenged the premises upon which the post-1945 population and economic policies of the first world were based.

FRANCE AND AUSTRALIA

At the end of the Second World War France and Australia both developed policies aimed at population growth for reasons of defence and economic growth. Both relied heavily upon immigration to achieve it. Both began with pronatalist policies, but Australia's pronatalist lobby lost much of its political influence in the mid 1950s.¹⁶

There is some conflict among immigration historians and sociologists as to whether France eventually launched a program that was exclusively economic, based on an intake of short-term immigrant workers, as Gary Freeman argues,¹⁷ or whether the program retained a nation-building (population-building) purpose. However the work of a number of writers supports the case that the French immigration program did retain population building characteristics.¹⁸

France and Australia may have coincided in their desire to build up population for defence purposes, but unlike Australia, France had never been particularly concerned about the size of her local market. Her policy had been to develop the EEC as an area of favoured trade and to develop exports further afield. Although early post-war Australian economic policy and practice had included export of food, fibres and some mineral resources, such as pig iron, the preoccupation of the business community had been to develop a big local market by increasing local population. This idea was particularly favoured by Australian manufacturers and the liberal party. It also came to be favoured by the property development and housing industries. After 1945 the primary idea was to develop Australia first. The idea of a huge local market provided by a huge population complimented this idea. Exports were a secondary consideration. The immense mineral wealth of Australia was virtually unsuspected in 1945.¹⁹

Importantly, both countries also began with post-war public housing policies. France kept hers as an important provider of housing to a substantial portion of the working classes. The French

government also had extensive authority to direct the planning of land-use development on a national basis. In Australia the Chifley war-time and post-war government had considered doing this but ultimately did not. Nevertheless the Australian government did go ahead with a federally funded and planned public housing plan. However, gradually between 1950 and 1955, the Australian government turned almost all home building over to private industry and most land continued to be privately developed on an *ad hoc* and speculative basis, not constrained by any national planning.²⁰

During these times - 1945 to the first oil shock - energy was cheap, and so were wages. (Marxism and capitalism co-incided in the belief that humans created as much wealth as they needed by extracting it and moulding it, almost like clay.) France refers to the years between 1945 and 1975 as "*les trente glorieuses*" - the thirty glorious years. Australia talks about "the long boom". In both countries much manpower was required - not necessarily skilled - to build infrastructure for industrial expansion and to work in industry, especially in manufacturing. Very gradually automation decreased the need for manpower, but since business was booming there was plenty of money to start up new businesses to provide jobs for nearly every worker. Automation was more of a choice than a competitive necessity.

This was the period of the "traditional" or "worker" immigrant of humble origins. In France, with the independence of her colonies and with the development of free movement and trade within a European Economic Community, this traditional immigrant worker came to be identified as coming from outside the EEC. The distinction was increasingly formalised within the EEC as time went on, particularly after 1973.

So, at the beginning of the period from 1945 until the first oil shock, France and Australia had a number of broad commonalities: they both had sought high immigration for economic reasons and to build up population for defence purposes. They both began with major housing shortages each initially attempted to resolve through important public housing schemes.

FRANCE AND AUSTRALIA: 1974: THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRST OIL SHOCK

Immigration:

All this was to change between 1973 and 1975, when, despite a short-lived and dramatic change of course on Australia's part, the population policies of the two countries - especially on immigration - drastically diverged.

Until 1974 immigration had contributed substantially to population growth in France and Australia. After 1974, when France brought in a policy of zero net immigration from outside the European Economic Community, the contribution of immigration to population growth in that country fell dramatically. But in Australia, except for a brief interruption in 1972, 1973, 1975 and 1976, high immigration continued as before.²¹

Trends in both countries have led to total fertility rates below the "replacement level" of 2.1 children per woman in France since 1974 and in Australia since 1976. This means that, apart from the self-limiting contributions of population momentum and increases in life expectancy, immigration is the only factor that will keep either population growing. It is also the major factor on which the two countries diverge after 1974. Immigration numbers as the major variable affecting ultimate population size has been a focus of my study. Land development planning and housing as a major variable affecting immigration has been the other.

Land Development Planning and Housing:

After 1974 in France a building boom came to a grinding halt as demand fell off from the private sector and the government greatly reduced its outlays on public housing construction and private

housing subsidies. Sociological studies record changes to the structure, operation and technology of the French (and Western European) housing industries, but virtually none in Australia, where the same pattern of rapid cycling booms and busts prevailed and where immigration numbers were interrupted for a short period - 1972, 1973, 1975 and 1976 - but then went on to rise and continue as before. Changes to policies and events in a wide variety of related areas during this government were relevant to the relationship between immigration, economic philosophy and the land development and building industries. After 1974 the different demographic philosophies in France and Australia respectively featured the absence and presence of lobbying for high immigration in the respective countries.

WHY IMMIGRATION POLICY DIVERGES IN FRANCE AND AUSTRALIA AND WHAT THE DIFFERENT LAND DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING POLICIES AND PRACTICES HAVE TO DO WITH THIS

How do we go about explaining why immigration policies in France and Australia (and the countries that resembled them) diverged so radically? Gary Freeman has sought answers to differences between France and Britain in *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies* (1979) and for that between European and other Western countries, including Australia and France in "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States" (1995).²² Freeman describes a situation he perceives in countries where high immigration has become institutionalised despite evidence that most people in these countries want less immigration. He uses a method derived from James Q Wilson²³ that classified four types of politics depending on whether the benefits and costs of policies were concentrated or diffuse, and he attempts to apply this model to immigration politics. In this way, Freeman comes to the conclusion that immigration has become entrenched in systems where its benefits are narrowly focused but the costs it imposes are diffuse (and therefore not easily identified by the public that is paying for them). I have found his approach and observations very useful.

According to Freeman's thesis, we would find the answer to the question about the difference between French and Australian immigration policies by seeing where concentrated benefits and costs and diffuse benefits and costs are located in each society in relation to immigration impacts. Narrowly focused benefits mean that those benefiting from them are consciously aware of this and are able to recognise each other and organise to keep those benefits flowing. Where costs are diffuse and fall upon a disparate population at many different points in many different ways, they are difficult to identify and there are no obvious political rallying points for the public to organise a protest around. In such situations the only such protests with focus tend to be nationalistically xenophobic and are therefore discounted as morally invalid, for obvious reasons.

Freeman explained the ability of France to abruptly and drastically reduce immigration in 1974 as due largely to organised French racist pressure groups triumphing over a weak and loosely organised defence of immigrants by "liberalist sympathisers" in the absence of an ethnic lobby.²⁴ The importance, however, of economic motives to cease immigration during the economic crisis that followed the 1973 Oil Shock, in the context of an overall European Economic Community policy for consolidation, should not be overlooked. Economic philosophies may be more important than any racial philosophies.

The 1973 oil shock provides a crucial period for comparing France with Australia, for, although Australia was to continue on its high immigration strategy for population growth after 1975, evidence is abundant to demonstrate that for a brief period there was a concerted organised political will and plan for Australia to restrain population growth by cutting down on immigration and to develop energy self-sufficiency, like the European plan. (There was also an Australian

program of land development reform and protection for employment.) How is it that Europe was able to put this plan into action, apparently so easily, but Australia was not?

I have identified differences in the construction and implementation of land development and housing policies and the structuring and organisation of these industries in France and Australia as major variables in the different evolutions of the immigration policies in these countries, particularly since the oil shock of 1973. Differences in construction and implementation of land development have been ongoing from the time of the beginning of the study - 1945. Housing policies began to diverge during the 1950s. But it was not until after 1973 that the structure, organisation and building techniques of the building industries that make dwellings really began to diverge. That is, these factors within the French building industry only really became prominent after the 1973 oil shock, and it was then that improvements in the industry in France made it progressively more unlike the Australian building industry, which made only minimal and patchy changes to modes of production and design. The task here is to explain how these differences may have impacted on immigration policy.

Freeman wrote that the politics of immigration in such systems can be analysed at the level of individual voters, organised groups, and State actors. He also said that the governments in liberal democracies arrive at their immigration policies through interaction with organised groups of the public between elections. Generally these are groups that receive "concentrated benefits" and therefore the immigration policies they give rise to are expansive.²⁵ He was thinking of North America, Canada and Australia, and contrasted these "English speaking settler societies" with selected European countries. The process is similar in the European group, except that there appears to be a lack of organised groups of beneficiaries of immigration.

Freeman separated his area of analysis into three groups of liberal democratic States: The "English speaking settler societies" (the United States, New Zealand, Canada and Australia); a group of mainly Western European States that had experienced mass migration²⁶ after the Second World War (France, Britain, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden); and a group of "European States which had until recently been sending countries" (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece). He summarised the English-speaking group by saying that their "institutionalised politics favours expansionary policies and is relatively immune to sharp swings in direction." By this he meant that, in general, it was difficult to make arguments heard on the subject of immigration except where those arguments were for more immigration or for the status quo. Of the second group of countries, which included France, he described their politics as being shaped by "what most see as the unfortunate consequences of those episodes [of post war mass migration]" and as being "partially institutionalised and highly volatile and conflictual".²⁷ For our purposes here we do not need to deal with the third group of countries. Freeman's analysis covered the period 1945 to the early 1990s. As mentioned above, he downplays the part played by nation-building (i.e. population growth for growth's sake) in the French post-war immigration program.²⁸ Freeman also focused on changes to policy after 1974, as I have done.

According to his method of identifying concentrated (or focused) costs and benefits, he identified organised opposition to immigration in France in both mainstream politics and populist politics. He believed the concentrated costs had come mostly from friction related to ethnic minority issues in the context of high unemployment. The xenophobic rhetoric of the extreme Right fanned this opposition. Freeman concluded that immigration policy and politics were not sufficiently institutionalised to withstand these pressures because the benefits of immigration were relatively diffuse and disorganised in France.²⁹ He described the opposite case as applying in the English speaking settler States, where immigration policy and politics were institutionalised around highly focused benefits from immigration and very diffuse costs. Moreover, where those costs were focused, their brunt fell on the poor and inarticulate who lacked organisations to represent them on these issues. Those relatively powerless people who bear these "principal immediate costs of

immigration" he identified as the minorities competing with immigrants for scarce jobs, housing, schools, and government services. Other writers have given the example of African Americans as typical of these groups, especially in the context of losing advantage to new waves of "Hispanic" immigrants.³⁰

Using the same theoretical framework as Freeman, I believe that my paper identifies a more concrete structural and economic difference between France (and the countries of the European Union with the exception of Britain and including the non-EU member, Sweden) and Australia (and the other English speaking liberal democratic settler societies, the United States, Canada and New Zealand.³¹)

As well as "the family and ethnic relations of those making up the immigrant streams, employers in labour intensive industries and those dependent on an unskilled workforce", Freeman identifies the "principal beneficiaries of immigration" in the English speaking settler societies broadly, as "businesses like real-estate and construction that profit from population growth."³²

Therein lies our clue to the difference. In France businesses like real estate and construction³³ do not appear to see themselves as profiting from immigration-fed population growth and, since most development is State planned, there appears to be no significant land development lobby either that identifies profits in immigration. These industries have in fact been especially sluggish in responding to immigrants' needs for housing. But this difference has for a long time apparently been invisible (or at least, uncommented upon) by sociological writers on population policies and immigration.³⁴ Differences between European and other Western States in planning land development and financing housing have been written about quite often by sociological writers on urban planning and the housing industry, but these scholars do not make a connection to immigration politics. Writers on urban planning have however observed that "assumptions and models derived from North American studies are not only simplistic in the European context, but at times quite erroneous. Cities in West Europe remain distinct, just as their approaches to planning remain distinct."³⁵ Ecological writers on population also frequently write about problems in land-use management.³⁶ Although they often connect population growth to destruction of indigenous fauna and flora habitats and farmland, to my knowledge none has looked at the differences in land development planning in the English speaking settler societies and in Western Europe. Since Western Europe is particularly low in biodiversity, this is not surprising. (But that situation is changing as forest cover increases with the shrinking rural populations.)³⁷ It is true that the subject of housing and planning comes up from time to time in French writing on immigration but, since these French writers seem unaware of the great difference in land development planning and housing between their society and that of the English speaking settler societies, no theory has fused these issues to date.³⁸

The important structural and economic difference, which seems to affect immigration policy, lies in the construction and implementation of land development planning and housing in France (and the countries of the EU, with the exception of Britain and with the inclusion of Sweden) as compared with Australia (and the other English Speaking settler societies.) We will concentrate here on France and Australia. The system in France can be described as "development planning" with priority given to public housing, where the system in Australia can be described as "statutory or land-use planning" prioritising the private development and housing industries.

In "development planning" the government assumes responsibility for supplying land for development by the private sector. First the government must purchase the land, preferably well in advance of its release to builders, when the cost is low. Having serviced the land, it rents or sells it at a price that covers the outlays it has made. The costs incurred at this point are generally much lower than those incurred by private developers and builders who generally borrow at high interest to purchase, develop and build on land and seek as high a profit as they are able to obtain.

So the government helps to keep the price of privately developed land down as well, since it is providing cheap competition. It can further lower the price of land by releasing a lot at a time, thus diminishing any price rises that might have occurred through land shortages at a time of high demand, which speculators rely on. Governments may either develop the land they have purchased or they may lease or sell it on condition that it is developed in a certain way, thus obviating opportunistic and socially incongruous or undesirable land uses.³⁹ In France, for instance, private developers have been required to provide transport and various amenities with estates.⁴⁰

Similar development planning systems to France's prevail in Germany, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland.⁴¹ In fact these are particularly pronounced in Germany and Sweden.⁴² I am inclined to treat Britain as a hybrid, sharing some characteristics with the English speaking settler societies that it seeded with both politics and people, and others with the more socially oriented land management and public housing European societies.⁴³ In fact Freeman's initial work on immigration examined the differences between immigration politics in France and the United Kingdom and I believe these and the differences in "development planning" are well enough established, despite Britain's entry into the European Union, to permit me to leave Britain out of my study. Although I have not had much to say about Sweden in my work on the relationship between immigration and the construction and implementation of land development and the housing industries, because Sweden is not part of the European Union⁴⁴ and therefore is not formally party to EU immigration laws, it nevertheless could belong in my group, according to its immigration and development planning policies.

It is important for the reader to understand that the major differences between France and Australia which we are dealing with here lie in France's retention of a strong public housing program⁴⁵ and a nationally planned land development system,⁴⁶ whereas in Australia, there is no central planning of land development and most land development is carried out by the private sector on land it has purchased, often speculatively.⁴⁷ Furthermore, in Australia, public housing has been greatly overshadowed by the private housing industry which supplies the vast majority of households. After the oil shock of 1973 France drastically cut down on immigration and shortly after this both public and private housing industries there began to adapt to the emerging energy conservative economy by a number of organisational and design innovations. In Australia, despite a short-lived policy to cut down immigration after the oil shock, immigration remained high and the housing industry made few adaptations to the post oil-shock economy.⁴⁸ The Whitlam government's attempts to bring about some centralised planning of land development were mostly frustrated and, after a short period of crises and crashes, the speculative private development industry thrived in a deregulated market, with increasingly high land prices.⁴⁹

From the comparison in this paper with France and Australia as examples typifying these differences in immigration policies and politics and approaches to land development planning I will attempt to show that the French system apparently identifies immigration with focused costs in a variety of ways, whereas the Australian system appears to identify many of these very same costs as focused benefits. It seems that, from these different perspectives, which amount to population-growth-costing systems, emerge quite different immigration policies in the two countries. In Australia, where immigration remains high, despite quite substantial public disapproval about this, the costs seem too diffuse to mobilise and focus any wide-based and influential section of society⁵⁰, whereas the benefits appear to have given rise to an active, well financed, highly organised lobbying sector – principally the private land development and housing industries. (Business associations wanting bigger local markets are also big lobbyists.)⁵¹ During the era of massive industrialisation in France, employers in manufacturing eagerly courted mass immigration, but changes to industry requirements, plus free movement within the EEC, seem to have eliminated the benefits focused in this area. With the Oil Shock of 1973 after which "worker immigration" was stopped throughout the European Economic Community no such organised

group seems to have arisen to defend high immigration, with the short-lived exception of the Confédération nationale du patronat français (National Federation of French Employers) (CNPFF).⁵² Patrick Weil attributes France keeping her borders open for one year longer than Germany to CNPFF lobbying. But as the recession bit, the CNPFF also became silent. This failure to protest at the closing of the borders to immigration seems almost certainly to have been because no group in receipt of narrowly focused benefits from high immigration existed any more. It seems reasonable to infer narrowly focused costs in a number of areas where there appear to be narrowly focused benefits in Australia, including tertiary education, where there is a limit on the number of foreign students which may attend any French university, but in Australia foreign students are courted by universities who benefit from the high fees they can charge these students.⁵³ However I shall be concentrating on land development and housing.

Just a word before I begin. Although I believe that this paper advances a plausible hypothesis and provides a likely explanation for differences in French and Australian immigration practices, I do not pretend to have presented an exhaustive examination of alternative explanations, such as the role of racialism. Time and space in this forum have prevented this. However I hope to deal with alternative explanations in more detail in a longer work in progress.

The role of land production, the housing construction industry, and public housing in immigration policy.

Land Ownership and Development:

France:

The rebuilding of Europe and of France, after the second world war was considered and carefully planned on a national basis.⁵⁴ Little was left to the *ad hoc* activities of local governments. Public transport was planned for as an integral part of land development planning. Public funding did not only depend on income tax, but a substantial proportion was linked to payroll related taxes and employers had certain tax responsibilities to assist in funding infrastructure for employees and townships where they operated.⁵⁵ So a number of costs seem to have been formally associated with development, housing and population growth.

Land production is the process by which land is acquired and developed. It makes a difference if the land that is developed and built on is privately or State owned. In France before the first world war and after the second world war, especially from 1953, the State compulsorily purchased urban land and went ahead and developed it.⁵⁶ It then usually resold the land to builders. In the same way that Australian governments may compulsorily acquire land for the purposes of building airports or roads, in France the State still compulsorily acquires land for public housing purposes where it deems that this is necessary. If the prices asked by the owners are too high, there is a system whereby a price is awarded according to an objective valuation of the property. Land taxes may also be charged on unearned and non-material improvement appreciation of property. In France rural land is also tightly controlled by law and may only be resold for agricultural purposes. It is practically impossible to rezone it for housing or other purposes.⁵⁷

Australia:

The situation is different in Australia (which resembles the United States, Canada and New Zealand.) In Australia the industry that purchases and develops land is also usually different from the one that builds the dwellings on it, but usually both are non-government. In Australia most urban land is privately owned and developed.⁵⁸ However the total cost for development is never entirely borne by developers - State and local governments assume nearly all responsibility for the provision of schools, most roads, hospitals, and associated infrastructure and services.⁵⁹ Australian State governments and politicians, with rare exceptions, tend to voice the belief that any

population growth will ultimately produce economic growth of some kind.⁶⁰ Local governments hope to rationalise costs through economies of scale financed by more rate payers.⁶¹ None of this development seems to be publicly admitted as a net cost, except by those who resent increasing density; erosion of value, both monetary and spiritual due to loss of positional advantages, such as views; loss of natural amenities, such as adjacent forests and undeveloped coastal areas; and degradation and depletion of farmland and its alienation due to the imposition of urban rates.

In Australia land speculating companies buy large pieces of undeveloped land at low prices in areas where they anticipate that population growth will occur later. Much of this land is rural. There is little protection for rural land in Australia and it is easy to rezone. In Queensland, particularly, which is the major frontier of development at the moment,⁶² farmers and other landowners may legally sue for compensation if their ability to clear land in order to attract a potentially high development price is frustrated by local councils.⁶³ Councils cannot afford to sustain such legal challenges. The development of land also attracts population growth.

When the population grows and roads and other infrastructure start to multiply around these areas, the developers divide these pieces of land into smaller pieces and single blocks, having provided them with basic infrastructure like water and electricity. They then offer these portions to building companies that construct dwellings. In Australia these are usually much smaller companies than the land purchase and development companies. These speculative developers choose their moment to release the land to builders and they try to wait until population pressure due to growth has created a high demand for housing.⁶⁴ Under these optimum conditions they then sell the land for as high a price as they can get from the builders. These little housing construction companies are obliged to wait until the land developers choose to release the land and they do not usually have many capital assets behind them. They generally borrow quite heavily from banks and other lending sources in order to buy these bits of land. They too depend on population pressure to raise demand and prices, for the more finance they borrow the less time they can afford to wait to sell the houses, since the amount of interest they pay is affected by the time they take to pay.

Home-building companies usually operate on a very slim profit margin.⁶⁵ Their profits depend on the cost of the land they buy, the cost of construction, the price they can sell the house from, the amount of interest they must pay and the length of time they borrow for. The Australian system of private land ownership and development has resulted in unusually high prices for urban land.⁶⁶ It has also kept the building industry poor and dependent on the private land development industry.⁶⁷

From the literature available to me comparing the development planning approach and the statutory or land-use planning approach, it appears that the main way to avoid the land speculation that fuels rising land costs, apart from stabilising and reducing population and thereby reducing demand, is for a government to purchase land at low prices and to resell it to builders for low prices.⁶⁸

In Australia the Chifley government had taken this direction after the second world war, in purchasing land and building public housing. However from 1950 the Menzies government began to withdraw support from the public housing program, giving private developers and builders almost exclusive domain over housing and land supply throughout Australia. In 1972 the Whitlam Government attempted to subsidise the States to purchase large quantities of land for low-price resale to builders, and succeeded in South Australia and some other territories and States to a limited degree.⁶⁹ However Whitlam's government was sacked in 1975 and these innovations were some of the first measures the succeeding Fraser Government got rid of.⁷⁰

Public Housing:

Most housing in France is either public housing or at least publicly subsidised.⁷¹ This presents a major contrast to most housing in Australia (and the United States, New Zealand and Canada), where the private market dominates almost but not quite to the point of exclusivity. Thus in France the role of government and public revenue in providing housing is significant, and the role of public housing is especially important for people of lower socio-economic status - a group which includes the traditional migrant.

Much public housing in France is rental and, although the rate of home ownership is rising, the public do not expect to own their own dwellings as a matter of right or tradition.

In France housing policy is made both nationally and at the local Government level and, at the local level, managers of public housing bodies are elected.⁷² It has therefore been possible for political parties to have their members elected as officers to such platforms and thus to play influential roles in local politics. This situation has permitted the development of one of the spearheads of anti-immigration policy and practice by the National Front (FN), which aimed at winning management of public housing estates known as HLMs⁷³ and prioritising access to the French born.⁷⁴ In Australia, funding for public housing is federal, but since 1956 it has contributed to an ever smaller proportion of total housing. Most housing is privately funded through private mortgages with no mortgage guarantee or tax deductibility.⁷⁵ State governments, not local governments are responsible for urban planning, and public housing and management is conducted by unelected bureaucrats. There is no similar platform for popular activism.

In France there are two special taxes which also constitute a major structural difference between France on the one hand and Australia (and the US, Canada and New Zealand) on the other. They are known respectively as the "1%" and the "0.2 per cent" taxes. These two taxes are levied on employers specifically for the provision of public housing. From 1953 public rental housing taxes of 1% of total salaries and then from 1978, 0.9% have been levied on non-agricultural companies with more than ten employees. In 1975 a 0.2% portion of the original 1% was allocated specifically to housing for immigrants. This portion was reduced to 0.1% when the first tax was reduced to 0.9% in 1978.⁷⁶ Some consequences of this are that employers are aware of housing as a cost to themselves and they are aware of immigrants specifically as a component of this cost. These employer public housing taxes are rights the wage earning public has acquired from employers in the post war semi-nationalised French State. Diversion of a portion of these funds to immigrant housing represents a structural erosion of these rights. The taxes are well known to the French public. The situation has been exploited by the National Front, which has included in its electoral platform the proposition that the 1% (now 0.9%) be raised back to 1% for the exclusive benefit of French families.⁷⁷ No similar situation where some housing costs are footed by employers via taxes exists in Australia (or the US, Canada and New Zealand, that I am aware of.)

Argument re the role of housing in immigration policy:

In Australia the property development industry and housing industry are major lobbyists for immigration-accelerated population growth. In France this is not the case. This difference is crucial for my hypothesis suggesting why France was able to drastically reduce non-EEC immigration on an indefinite basis from 1974, but Australia was not. There simply seems to have been no focused pressure from within France to perpetuate high immigration or high population growth of any kind. And there appears to have been a collection of focused pressure points which discouraged immigration. Costs either were more focused or at least appeared to be. In Australia the reverse seems to have been true.

In France, the activities of the private housing development industry appear to be circumscribed due to public development planning and the private housing industry seems to cater mainly to people who are reasonably well off and well established. Therefore it would not appear to depend

on the few traditional "worker" immigrants who continue to arrive, nor upon the larger stream of families of established "worker" immigrants who are generally of very humble means. This would explain why the industry did not appear to lobby for "worker immigration"⁷⁸. The public housing industry did not lobby for it either, since it was government financed and all such housing was perceived to be a cost rather than an opportunity for profit. French housing policy was pronatalist up to the early 1970s⁷⁹ in favouring the poorest families with the most children, but companies providing housing (publicly funded and other) seem not to have lobbied for population growth of any kind, before or after 1975, and appear to have been particularly sluggish in providing housing for immigrants. This was despite the fact that the need for immigrant housing seems constantly to have been at crisis level.

This situation represents a crucial difference between France (and Europe) and Australia (and the US, Canada and New Zealand). In Australia the private development and housing industries have flourished in the virtual absence of public housing competition and any growth in population represents an opportunity to make a profit. These industries have become enthusiastic promoters and lobbyists for high immigration and could be described as dependent on immigration-accelerated population growth. Although the Australian immigration system drives private home-buying prices up and therefore represents a cost to the Australian population, this cost has no observable direct relationship with government spending on infrastructure or on taxes levied on the people. Because of this there seems to be no strong national perception that population growth is costly - except environmentally and ecologically (especially as concerns native biodiversity.) This latter perception is quite widely held amongst some politicians, ecological scientists and those who read their work. However this environmental view seems not to be popular within the financial and business community and would not appear to have mobilised widespread opposition to immigration among the general public. The environmental costs of population growth seem to be a diffuse cost in Australia.

But in France, due to the prominent role of public housing and public subsidies for purchasing houses in all sectors, perceptions of the cost of providing housing for a growing population (whether fuelled by immigration or natural increase) seem to have been a factor in the minds of Government.⁸⁰ This perception appears to have been reinforced by one among the general public that public housing was scarce and that immigration intensified this scarcity.⁸¹ Thus groups among the public — especially those of lower socio-economic status — seem to have come to associate immigrants with competition for the scarce resource of housing, a perception which seems to have made them resentful of any rises in immigration and which was, as I have already mentioned, apparently exploited by the National Front at the level of elected management of public housing (HLMs). The situation also seems to have been exploited by the Left, who may have seen the violence and degradation of the *bidonvilles* as a way to shame the government. In 1973 Algeria stopped immigration to France explicitly on the grounds of the violence and racialism.⁸² So immigrant housing seems to have become a political flashpoint by 1968 and, by 1974, the political and financial costs seem clearly to have outweighed the benefits,⁸³ in the eyes of the government, the lower socio-economic sector that wanted priority in housing, and the government of Algeria. The left were not actually anti-immigrant⁸⁴ but their drawing attention to the plight of immigrants may have increased the political costliness of the immigrants. The left were calling for more housing for immigrants and that was a financially costly project, as well as being difficult to achieve logistically since most councils seem not to have wanted to take on immigrant housing. Apparently immigrants had become concentrated in Communist local government areas and the Communist mayors were asking for greater distribution of immigrants to other neighbourhoods.⁸⁵ When the oil crunch came it seems that immigrant housing was also a good place to cut expenses.

It is also important to realise that non-naturalised immigrants from outside the EEC may not vote in local elections in France, so in this sense they would have been political dead-weights to the

local governments that attempted to house them. There is some evidence that attempts were made to induce inhabitants of *bidonvilles* to apply for citizenship in return for housing, but that many were reluctant to apply.⁸⁶

It seems that immigrant housing continues to be associated with violence and conflict so local councils and housing bodies avoid allowing it to be built or allocated in their areas. Immigrants thus form a large part of those living in substandard housing.⁸⁷ This must make it difficult for them to meet the requirements of suitable accommodation (see below) for organising family reunion, and thus would form a barrier to chain migration.

In Australia the situation was, once again, quite different. Immigrants were a long way down the public housing queue and most relied on the private market, both rental and purchase, as did increasingly the ordinary Australian. They were in fact relatively close to the national average in private purchase. Even directly after the war when there was a more comprehensive public housing program in place, it seems that the government avoided placing immigrants in competition for housing with the locally born population. It has been suggested that a way in which they avoided this was through the creation of "work camps" which provided very basic temporary accommodation specifically for immigrant workers and their families.⁸⁸ In France such a strategy seems to have been ruled out due to identification of work camps with Nazi concentration camps and camps in France that had abused refugees.⁸⁹ The post 1945 French government was a pronatalist one committed to prioritising public housing for the poorest French families with the greatest number of children. With a sluggish housing industry and with the additional problem of clearing bomb damage and reconstructing damaged sites to deal with, the government appears to have left immigrants almost entirely to fend for themselves as far as housing was concerned for much of the period between 1945 and 1974. Much of the urban French population was also living in slums due to the chronic housing shortage which the war had exacerbated, but the immigrants lived in the worst conditions of all.

These practical obstacles notwithstanding, there was, from 1946, a requirement of suitable accommodation before immigrant family reunion could legally⁹⁰ or practically be satisfied. According to French immigration historians, in the absence of suitable accommodation, the reunion of families which the populationist demographers on De Gaulle's population planning committee had hoped for was delayed and staggered due to the housing situation. Largely because of this immigrants during the early post war years tended to be short staying single male workers and many commuted periodically between their home countries and France.⁹¹ Nevertheless an immigrant population with a substantial family component built up in the slums that became known as *bidonvilles*. The codified requirement of suitable accommodation⁹² was used to counter family reunion especially after 1974, when the policy of zero net immigration meant that worker immigration from outside the European Economic Community was ceased indefinitely.⁹³ Between 1974 and 1977 there were attempts to arrest family reunion outright as well, which were overturned according to European law. European law makes family reunion a right⁹⁴ This right could however be controlled by recourse to the suitable accommodation requirement and the OMI (Office des Migrations Internationales) had the right to physical inspection.⁹⁵ In Australia, to my knowledge, accommodation has never been used as a major argument to deny entry.⁹⁶ Family reunion in Australia is not a legal right in the codified sense that exists in France and European law, although tradition has created strong legal precedents, and so it is legally easier to refuse immigrants simply by imposing categories and numerical limits.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ENERGY, ECONOMY, HOUSING AND IMMIGRATION POST 1974 IN FRANCE AND AUSTRALIA

The provision of housing is the domain of the building industry. There are important differences between the building industries in France and Australia. In Australia the industry has a high

reliance on *skilled* immigrant labor. This seems not to be the case in France. In France the industry is strongly associated with the employment of *illegal* and *unskilled* labor,⁹⁷ but legitimate needs for skilled labor seem generally to be considered to be quite adequately met, with some difficulties in exceptional circumstances or where rare and disappearing trades are required.⁹⁸ In fact industry reluctance to take trainees of apparently foreign stock has become the subject of a French government campaign against discrimination.⁹⁹

In Australia, the reason given for the reliance of employers on imported skilled labor is that employers and the State combine to offer very few apprenticeships, apparently preferring the cheaper option of imported fully trained skilled labor. This is a very long standing practice.¹⁰⁰ The low profit margin and the boom and bust cycle that characterises the Australian building industry to this day has apparently also meant that the industry has been able to invest little in training and this is likely to have reinforced the need for immigrants since work available depends on the boom and bust cycle as well. The effect of this is that building workers have tended to seek other kinds of employment and become unavailable to the industry.¹⁰¹

The Australian building industry's importation of skilled labour is significant for the arguments advanced in this paper because the practice of relying on importing skilled tradespersons whenever a building boom was underway, rather than investing in a stable, educated and sophisticated pool of local skilled labour, would have contributed to the industry being poorly equipped to reorganise and modernise.

In France, as we have seen, the industry was never reliant on the boom and bust of immigration induced population growth. However, up until 1974, it had been able to rely on quite a steady demand for housing in all sectors, and this had been buoyed up by the State through a range of low interest loans and subsidies for a variety of housing options, including renovations, rentals and middle class home purchase. After the war public housing had been a strong middle class option, but as the economy and housing availability had improved for the French, the upwardly mobile began to seek alternatives. This increased opportunities for the building industry to cater for a growing private sector.¹⁰²

Through the late 1960s to the early 1970s, household formation had accelerated in France. This was to do with the increasing independence of young adults from families, higher incomes, high immigration and the recent baby-boom. However after 1973 the rate of new household formation dropped. In France 1974 and 1975 had the lowest total population growth (natural increase and net immigration combined) since the second world war. Similar demographic situations prevailed throughout Western Europe. The absence of interventionist populationist policies, either pronatalist or immigrationist, proved enduring and would seem to testify to massive revision of growthist post war population policy. In the long term this policy seems to have amounted to a demographic policy to stabilise population growth and it has also had the impact of reducing rate of growth in national energy consumption. Western Europe now has substantially slower household formation than Australia.¹⁰³

Following the first oil shock in 1973, it seems that the industry adapted to the slowing pace of local demand, rather than trying to artificially generate it, and specialist literature indicates that it cut down on its costs through restructuring and technological change, leading to a greater need of skilled workers but more money to finance research and training. These structural and organisational changes to the French (and other western European) building methods and practices seem to be important differences between Australia and France.¹⁰⁴

Combined with different demographic, economic and energy consumption policies in France and Australia, these different characteristics of the building industries in the respective countries would have either assisted adaptation to slower population growth or have given rise to renewed

lobbying for immigration,¹⁰⁵ according to my hypothesis. This complex of policies and interest groups will be described in detail in a longer work of mine, but, for the purposes of this paper, I will briefly establish what I think may have happened.

During the first oil shock¹⁰⁶ there was a concerted organised political will and plan for Australia to restrain population growth and to better plan and manage land development and housing. This would have brought Australian policy more in line with policies in France (and Europe) at that time. Whereas these policies were enduring in France, it seems they did not survive the Australian system of focused costs and benefits attached to population growth. This conclusion is suggested by differences in outcome in population growth and housing production. The building industry in France seems to have adapted to decreasing household formation, but the Australian industry appears to have avoided this and to have continued to use old fashioned methods of production and to rely on high population growth.

The Western European reaction to the 1973-74 oil shock was in many ways very different and more sustained than Australia's or the United States'. This was particularly so for developed economies which had no oil of their own, like France.¹⁰⁷ Historical consumption figures and other documents indicate that France aimed for energy self-sufficiency and to accumulate oil assets, as well as to develop nuclear energy and cut down on energy use overall through better technology and innovation.¹⁰⁸

As we know, in the European Economic Community the economic crisis occasioned a policy of total suspension of worker immigration from outside Europe, led by Germany in 1973. France was the last State to follow, in 1974.¹⁰⁹

The rationale that accompanied these steps in France appears to have been based on the perception that economic hardship would be long lasting, blow out of population in the Third World would be inevitable, and that France could not save the world's poor by taking them all in. André Postel-Vinay, the Minister responsible for immigration at the time, said that three factors made ceasing immigration a preventative necessity: the doubling of third world population by late in the 20th Century; the likelihood of profound and lengthy economic crisis; and the problem of the public housing shortage for both French and foreigners.¹¹⁰

This was to become long-term policy in France and the EEC.

What is frequently not realised is that Australia temporarily developed very similar policies to France's.

Prime Minister Whitlam in Australia and Postel-Vinay in France had apparently similar perspectives on the global situation. In 1974 Rex Connor, who was the Minister for Resources and Energy under the Whitlam government, had convinced Whitlam to undertake a project, of Connor's conception, to make Australia energy self-sufficient by building a massive pipeline connecting natural gas production supplies throughout Australia. According to significant documentation, this was in fact the main objective of the notorious Khemlani loan.

On December 13, 1974 the executive council of the Commonwealth of Australia, made up of Prime Minister Whitlam, Attorney-General Murphy, Treasurer Cairns, and the Minister for Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor¹¹¹ met to find finance for Rex Connor's project and to fund unemployment reduction. For this they sought \$US 4,000,000,000 (four billion US dollars). The minute of the meeting stated,

"The Australian government needs immediate access to substantial sums of non-equity capital from abroad for temporary purposes, amongst other things to deal with exigencies

arising out of the current world situation and the international energy crisis, to strengthen Australia's external financial position, to provide immediate protection for Australia in regard to supplies of minerals and energy and to deal with current and immediately foreseeable unemployment in Australia."¹¹²

At this point Australia was apparently poised, momentarily, on a similar policy path of self-sufficiency to France and the EEC's. But this was not to be. The Whitlam Government was brought to an abrupt and ignominious halt by the associated Khemlani loan scandal.¹¹³

Complementing these Whitlam energy policies, as we have seen, there was also an Australian program of land development reform. But the Whitlam government had quite an array of other policies that resembled France's. These included free education and training, reduction of immigration to protect local employment, enhancement of immigrant opportunities for training and learning English, subsidised family planning (contraception and abortion) and free health care.¹¹⁴


The Whitlam government abolished the Department of Immigration and replaced it with the Australian Population and Immigration Council. Of the decision to cut down on immigration, Whitlam himself writes,

"The Government, due to the advent of the world recession, was forced to constantly reduce its annual targets for migrant intake. The size of the new settler program was reduced from 140,000 to 110,000 in December 1972, to 80,000 in late 1974 and to 50,000 in late 1975. On 2 February 1975, the Australian Population and Immigration council was established to assist the Government in the accurate assessment of Australia's immigration and population needs."¹¹⁵

France's response to the massive price rises in oil based energy was drastic; oil imports were sharply reduced as the French State, in conjunction with business, set about a strategy of maximising energy self-sufficiency. Some strategies were the further development of nuclear energy to replace oil generated electricity, improvement of technological efficiency, and organisational restructuring. The State sought to cushion the effects of the unemployment that followed by maintaining generous social welfare policies, including unemployment benefits and enhanced opportunities for education and training.¹¹⁶

Whereas these policies have endured in France, where it seems that more focused costs than focused benefits were attached to immigration, they did not survive the Australian system with its many focused benefits and few focused costs attached to immigration.

As noted in the introduction to this paper, increases in energy consumption and human population since World War Two challenge economic policies based on consumption and population growth. Although there are limited alternatives to oil based energy, including nuclear, Australia appears to have failed to explore these.¹¹⁷ Apart from this single aborted attempt at implementing the quite radical policies alluded to above, Australia continued and increased its reliance on oil-based energy. Even in the short-term, it had little success in diminishing oil energy consumption, and continued a population building policy entailing high immigration. In the absence of dramatic cuts in per capita oil consumption, it would appear inevitable that high immigration would increase overall oil-based consumption merely by increasing the Australian population. Below is a comparison of national oil-based energy consumption and population curves for both countries.




Graph 1. France : Total Oil Consumption and Total Population, 1965-1997.

Source: Petroleum based energy consumption: BP Amoco Historical Download excel file of 'World Oil Consumption 1966-1999', website, www.bp.com/worldenergy/xl/hxl/
 French Population numbers: French Population Data, from 1946-1990: Roselyne Kerjosse, Irène Tamby: "La situation démographique en 1994: mouvement de la population", Institution national des études économiques (INSEE) Paris, 1996, 264P.: carte, graph, Tableau; 30 cm, Tableau 3, "Evolution de la population totale depuis 1946, Evaluation fondée sur les résultats des recensements de 1946 à 1990." Data source for 1987-1997 was INSEE: "France Métropolitaine. Indicateurs démographiques 1987 a 1997" (As at 1 January).

Note that France made more dramatic reductions from 1980, after the second oil shock.

If we compare Graph 1 with Graph 2, of Australia, we can see that France's population growth is relatively slow and that this has perhaps assisted its ability to reduce total oil consumption, which has remained well below record high levels in 1973. (Per capita oil consumption has only recently begun to rise slightly since 1980.) It is likely that this increase in use will be sharply reined in after the oil shock of 1999-2000.



Graph 2: Australia: Total Oil Consumption and Total Population Growth.

Source: Petroleum based energy consumption: BP Amoco Historical Download excel file of 'World Oil Consumption 1966-1999', website, www.bp.com/worldenergy/xl/hxl/
 Population numbers: Total Annual Population figures for Australia data source for all tables were, from 1978 to 1997, from Demographic Statistics, ABS, Cat no 3101.0. Figures for 1952 to 1977 are from J. Shu, S. E. Khoo, A. Struik and F. McKenzie, Australia's Population Trends and Prospects 1993, (BIR), AGPS, Canberra 1994. Figures for 1945 to 1951 are from Demography 1954, Bulletin No. 72, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics. (Total population at 31st of December of the year named)

Notes for comparison: Although Australia's total consumption of oil is less than France's, on a per capita basis it is about one third higher, according to calculations based on the same source. Australia's population is about one third the size of France's. If we compare this graph with the one above, we can see that Australia's population growth is relatively fast.


If we compare Graph 2 with Graph 1 above, we can observe a single small dip in energy use in 1973. Although Australia did manage to make some small reductions in total oil use between 1980 and 1987, after the oil shock, nevertheless, use has risen quite steeply in comparison with France's. Australia has never managed to keep its oil use below 1973 levels and the general trend has been far above this. The rapid population growth has probably contributed to this pattern.

After Whitlam, a liberal government, headed by Malcolm Fraser, returned Australia to its traditional nation-building population policy course and away from nation consolidation.¹¹⁸

Among the industry and economic adaptations in France were the changes in the housing construction industry, which adapted to a decline in demands (brought on by energy rationalisation, economic strictures and decline in population growth) for new housing stock by promoting renovation of old properties, much of which was also energy conserving due to the stimulation afforded to the industry by the oil crisis.¹¹⁹ As new dwellings fell by 3.7% per annum between 1974 and 1985, renovations increased by 0.9% over the same period.¹²⁰ What this means is that the French were spending some money upgrading their homes, for instance on insulation and other innovations to reduce domestic fuel consumption, but there was little formation of new households in new homes (which involves a much greater outlay).

The French government also reduced its annual commitments to public housing construction and to subsidised loans for the purchase of both public and privately constructed dwellings. As well as this, inflation affected the public's ability to purchase houses as it did everything else. These

factors combined to produce a very severe recession in the housing industry and many companies failed. On a graph total production of housing in all sectors in France falls away dramatically from 1974, although the private sector struggled on a little longer than the public, until about 1975.¹²¹



Graph 4. France and Australia, Total New Dwellings Commenced, 1964-1997

Source for Australia: ABS Timelines series, 875001_wks, Table 1, "Number of Dwelling Units Commenced: Seasonally Adjusted and Trend."

Sources for France: The original source for all my secondary sources was the Ministère de l'Équipement, du logement, des transports et de la Mer. My actual sources were: *Insee Annuaire Rétrospective de la France, 1948-1988*, Tableau 1, "Situation de la construction", for the years 1948-1988 and *Annuaire Statistique de la France*, INSEE 1999, for or the years 1992-1997. The figures for the years in between (1989-1991) came from Maurice Blanc and Laurence Bertrand, *Housing Policy in Europe*, Routledge, 1996, p.127, for the years 1980-1991.

This graph shows how abruptly the construction of new dwellings fell in France and how different the pattern was in Australia, where no long term change in demand or production occurred.

This was a time of major reorganisation of how the housing, building and private developer industries operated in France. After a rash of (largely British inspired) investment in speculative office blocks and housing estates,¹²² which, in the absence of high population growth and high economic growth do not pay, the private industry adapted to customer demand and factory construction and introduced a requirement for major prepayments. Factory construction meant that less building was done on sites. The major components of dwellings could be built in factories and assembled later on sites. In effect, rather than purchasing a site and erecting dwellings, then awaiting buyers, the builder waited instead for orders for houses from home buyers who already had a site. Materials could then be ordered as necessary, components of the house could be constructed in the factory and later transported and assembled on site. Up front and total costs to the builder were minimised.¹²³

The building industry in France adapted to decreasing household formation, but the Australian industry had no need to and continues to use very inefficient methods of production.

As we know, Australia had been unable or unwilling to educate and train enough skilled tradesmen.¹²⁴ Greater funding and access to education and training were particularly important if the building industry was to change its boom and bust approach to business. The Whitlam Government's policies to improve access to training, combined with urban planning innovation, might have improved this situation. Like the French, Australians now had free tertiary education and technical and further education and training. This was a revolutionary policy, for, With the Whitlam government's plans for reducing immigration and the Commonwealth funding the States to buy up land cheaply, there would not have been the same opportunities for private speculation. If these strategies had succeeded, in combination with much reduced net immigration and, arguably, policies for lower energy use, it seems likely the housing industry in Australia might have adapted to a much lower rate of population growth and household formation. However these measures were doomed, along with the Whitlam government.

After the Whitlam government was sacked, and during high unemployment, the Fraser Liberal/National Party government (November 1975- March 1983) reinstated economic policies that were dependent on rapid population growth - through high immigration - and high energy consumption.

The Fraser Government also commenced the first of a long series of steps to dismantle the free tertiary education system. The Australian housing industry continued to depend on speculative land development and to rely on high immigration to feed population growth and thus demand. The industry did little to modernise and adapt to factory style production on demand. There was little significant improvement to energy efficiency in design. The structure and finance of the industry continued to give little support for developing a local system to provide skilled tradesmen and so the industry continued its strong reliance on imported skilled labour. As the economy was opened up to the ideology of free market forces, speculation and housing price inflation increased, with strong encouragement from the Australian Treasury.¹²⁵

CONCLUSION

I asked the question earlier, How is it that Europe was able to put a plan of low immigration into action, apparently so easily, but Australia was not?

Gary Freeman's work comparing France and Australia and other polities has provided a clear and useful approach to answering this question.

As I wrote towards the beginning of this paper, space and time have unfortunately precluded my dealing exhaustively with other possible or partial explanations for these differences in France's and Australia's immigration policies. It is likely that other factors did affect the situation, however I believe that my hypothesis is a plausible one and provides an explanation for a substantial part of these differences.

The nationally based land development planning system in France did not favour land speculation. Land speculation traditionally relies on episodes of peak demand to which fast or irregular spurts of population growth are an important contribution, but the French system did not develop an institutionalised dependency on these and therefore no focused group appears to have formed to encourage immigration as a source of such population growth. The public housing system provided for lower socio-economic groups and undertook, if it did not actually succeed brilliantly at this, to provide housing for immigrants. This meant that the French private housing industry confined most of its activity to the wealthier socio-economic sector, which included few of the traditional worker immigrants who entered the country in quantities, especially prior to 1974. So the housing industry does not appear to have been dependent on immigration-fed population growth either.

This would help to explain the fact that there was apparently little fuss when non-EEC immigration was officially ceased. After 1974, adaptation to economic and energy related strictures by the manufacturing sectors, including the building industry, appears to have led to an absence of lobbying for immigration. Manufacturing and other labour intensive industries changed their manpower needs, seeking more highly trained workers and more efficient technology. These changes occurred within a supportive European EEC/EU political and economic environment, that assisted the ability of France and other EEC members to satisfy labor and market needs. The economy seems to have adjusted to the prospect of a stable or declining local population, supplemented by an export oriented market.

In France lobbying for worker immigration by employers in the manufacturing industries, who had been up until then concentrated beneficiaries of immigration, ceased after their manpower needs changed, subsequent to the Oil Shock of 1973. France's post 1973 energy and demographic policies seem to indicate a greater attunement to energy related costs than seems to prevail in Australia.¹²⁶

The French agricultural system was and remains another beneficiary of imported labor, however cheap seasonal labor for French agriculture is allowed for by the French immigration system, which counts it apart from ordinary worker immigration and administers it separately.¹²⁷ Industries like restaurants and hotels, municipal services, and construction in France, which tend to employ imported labor do not appear to be sufficiently organised or sensitised to this issue to form a pressure block to maintain or increase official supply. An unverifiable portion of their needs is almost certainly provided by illegal immigrants.

As long as this minor workforce remains illegal and relatively sparse it appears to exert little pressure on social security, education and housing costs, in part because it has no right to assert its presence. From time to time there are amnesties in France and other EEC countries where a proportion of this labour is given the opportunity to apply for citizenship and this seems to amount to a defacto permanent immigration policy at times. As a balance to the toleration of illegal labour, the French have a quite aggressive system of fines and punishments for employers who push the envelope too far regarding illegal labour. This is exercised with a formal discretionary component.¹²⁸

There were and are a number of focused costs which appear to be associated with immigration in the minds of the public and politicians. Many are associated with housing. These include conflicts over allocation to immigrants of part of the taxes collected from employers for public housing. These tax issues have been used by the National Front to highlight the public housing shortage to the detriment of immigrants. Elections for HLM management committees have provided opportunities for the National Front to campaign for public housing to be the exclusive right of the French. Public housing is a public cost and responsibility, so any increased demand for it or conflict associated with it is problematic for the government. Immigrants (unless they are citizens of the European Economic Community) cannot vote in local elections and immigrant housing has become associated with violence and conflict so local councils avoid allowing it to be built in their areas. Immigrants thus form a large part of those living in substandard housing. This must make it difficult for them to meet the requirements for organising family reunion, and thus would form a barrier to chain migration.

The question of manpower for national defence no longer arises since France's size has caught up with that of her traditional enemies (whose fertility rates are lower, especially those of Germany, the original source of pronatalist competition). Furthermore, with the importance of the European Union all these old enemies are now mutually dependent. The prospect of an aging population is viewed with a certain amount of equanimity, in the knowledge that this is a problem that has built

in limits, since the aging population will die. The North American 'solution' of 'replacement migration' is viewed as profoundly eccentric by French demographers.¹²⁹ Economic solutions appear to be the only ones seriously contemplated and these are presently under discussion, with the necessity to capitalise French pension funds being as hotly debated as it was in Australia during the 1980s.¹³⁰ There is no noticeable European lobby that connects local population growth with economic growth; the strategy is for export trade. And so France enters the twenty first century, along with the rest of the EEC, with a well accepted possibility of population stabilisation and decline and a Malthusian economy.¹³¹

Australia's position and outlook are quite different. In my opinion they derive much of their character from the economic philosophy of the United States. This is because Australia is part of an anglophone bloc that is dominated by US media sources. The United States sees demographic growth and renewal through immigration as fundamental requirements of economic growth and the need for continuous economic growth as unquestionable. I have had quite wide discussions with US citizens and Australians on related issues and they have very little awareness of other points of view. The aging of the United States and Australia's population are seen as dramatic economic threats. Although the United States total fertility rate is very close to replacement and is rising, the longevity of the US baby-boom cohort is proving a problem for the continued provision of social security. The US political system appears powerless to change the social security system, which is, like the French ones, not capitalised.

However the situation with the aging cohort in Australia is different. To begin with, we began to capitalise our social security system - through a system of pensions and superannuation - quite early by international standards.¹³² Our aging cohort is also not nearly as large as Europe's or the USA's. And the problem is self limiting through death. Immigration - except in absurdly huge quantities - makes virtually no difference to the aging of the population, but aging is still used aggressively to promote high immigration.

A number of high profile political and economic actors and agents also aggressively promote high immigration as a means of having a much larger population which they deem a necessity for economic growth. Since the early 1900s manufacturing, particularly in Victoria, has been arguing for high population growth in order to provide a bigger local market, rather than talking about exporting more.¹³³

Population growth is also still cited as necessary for defence, although not by the military, who rely on technological superiority and mutual economic alliances rather than force of numbers in modern warfare. In a region with behemoth populations it is hard to see Australia ever catching up with the populations of its rapidly growing neighbours and so this argument seems absurd on several levels.

All in all, there does not seem to be much philosophical logic attached to Australian growthism. However there is the practical but covert logic of vested interests. As Gary Freeman theorised, these promoters of growth speak for or come from industries and organisations that are beneficiaries of focused growth. And they have the ears of government. In contrast to France most items that appear as costs related to immigration there appear as focused benefits in Australia. This is in part because they are private costs where in France they are public costs. So, in Australia the following consequences of population growth are seen as opportunities for profit and thus all have their champions: the need for increased infrastructure, such as roads; the need for more houses; property inflation, which provides more local council rates and enables owners to speculate on their homes, increased local population density (more rate payers) and competition for space. Competition for space leads to rezoning and windfalls for speculators. Banks, building societies, insurance companies and other financial institutions all rely on property development and home mortgages as reliable sources of regular revenue with built in growth. You and I and

most other Australians rely on these institutions to provide us with loans and to invest our money for us, so we rely on the role of population growth in raising land and housing prices. These are the focused benefits related to land development and housing industries, but there are many other focused benefits built into the system, and more are being added every day.

Australia also competes internationally with production based on prices for petroleum based energy which are still comparatively cheap by European standards and so growth in population and consumption per capita seems only to present a problem in how fast we can acquire the investment capital to provide the infrastructure to keep satisfying demand and how quickly we can develop new industries here to attract a wealthy class of immigrant. Lack of national planning at the level of infrastructure and pollution control or adaptation to new sources of energy means that we don't count the costs of all this growth; the only national accounts we keep are a financial balance sheet that is ill equipped to cost the erosion of natural resources like water, soil and biodiversity. In our economic system these problems are merely flagged as future opportunities for investment in technologies that may be used to fight them; sewerage recycling systems, mapping systems for locating salinization, freeways for redistributing and organising traffic congestion. Somehow our national accounting system is unable to question the advisability of continuing depreciation of the natural resources that provide essential services to our economy. Politically the question is raised but economically the system is unable to support the political measures that could stop the damage.¹³⁴ It seems in comparison that the political and economic system in France and Western Europe has been more successful in costing population and energy consumption growth than Australia's and those of the other English speaking settler countries.

Writers on urban planning have observed that "Assumptions and models derived from North American studies are not only simplistic in the European context, but at times quite erroneous. Cities in West Europe remain distinct, just as their approaches to planning remain distinct."¹³⁵ This comment was made about writers on urban planning, but could apply to other comparative sociological studies of Europe.

Quite a lot has been written comparing European and other Western demographic policies. To my knowledge, no anglophone population sociologist has written before of the connection between land development planning and immigration as a factor in population growth politics. Perhaps this is indeed because we have been hindered by assumptions based on local models.

Indeed it seems to me that attention to the relationship between population growth, immigration and land development planning and housing has wider implications for sociological study. It could be applied to the third world to see if, for instance, Chinese development planning deters population growth whereas laissez-faire planning in India promotes it. A study of the land development planning traditions in Fiji (bloodline inheritance without the possibility of selling outside the Fijian ethnic community) might help to explain the difficulties in integrating the two disparate communities of Indian and islander Fijian. Comparing Australian land planning with French planning could also be used to explain the inaccessibility of home ownership for Australians due to high prices and the flight to cheaper housing away from the major cities, especially Sydney. I also dare to hope that better appreciation of differences in land management might assist us to combat the growing desertification of our continent and the destruction of biodiversity and natural amenity due to uncontrolled land clearing.

END NOTES

¹ Data was from Australian Demographic Statistics, June Quarter 1997, ABS Cat. 3101.1, p16, and *Projections of the Population of Australia, States and Territories 1995-2051*, Cat. 3220.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, pp134-135, Tables 9.8 and 9.9 and Population Projections, Australia, 1999 to 2101, Catalogue No. 3222.0. According to past trends in factors contributing to the rate of population growth in Australia, the decisive factor in these population projections is the rate of net migration. In France (see next footnote) this is not the case, since immigration trends are lower overall and also in relation to the population base.

Net migration figures for Australia are, compared to France's, of high significance in determining population growth. This is because their contribution to total growth, on a proportionate basis, is much greater than in France. Between 1945 and 1997 Total Net Migration in Australia averaged 36.9% of Total Population Growth - over one third - with a range of -7.0% to 58.6% and a mean of 40.4%. This contrasts with France's average of 23.2%, a range between 6.3% and 74.7% and a mean of 23.8%. These figures are from my own research using, for Australia, total net immigration from 1945, defining Total Net Immigration as the difference between total arrivals and total departures annually as at 1 December. Sources were for 1945-1951, *Demography 1954*, Bulletin No. 72, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics; those for 1952 - 1977 were from J Shu, S E Khoo, A Struik and F McKenzie, *Australia's Population Trends and Prospects 1993*, (BIR), AGPS, Canberra 1994; those for 1978-1997 are from *Australian Demographic Statistics*, ABS, Catalogue no. 3101.0 (various issues). Much of this data was kindly provided to me by Dr Katharine Betts, Swinburne University.

The ABS projection series explore a number of scenarios:

The 1995 Series C: "High Fertility, Low Overseas Migration", gives projections with a Total Fertility Rate of 1.865, net migration of 100,000, departing from a total population of 18,182,400 in 1996. Under such conditions, Australia would have been on course to reach a total population of 28,270,700 persons. This population would still be increasing at a rate of 0.4%.

Trends in net migration numbers are running against a similar scenario. Australia's total fertility rate has been below 1.865 now since 1994, when it declined to 1.85 and for the last couple of years it has been around 1.77. Total Net Migration went well over 100,000 in 1995 and 1996, but the average was 87,169 over the ten years from 1988-1997. Averages taking in fifteen and twenty years from 1997 back are however, in the low 90,000s.

1995 Series A: "High Fertility, Low Overseas Migration", gives projections with a Total Fertility Rate of 1.865, net migration of 70,000, departing from a total population of 18,182,400 in 1996. Under such conditions, Australia would have been on course to reach a total population of 26,037,200 persons. This population would still be increasing at 0.3%.

But fertility trends may stay slightly below 1.865 and net migration trends are running against a similar scenario. Current net migration trends run over this projection, being far greater than 70,000 per annum. Such a scenario is unlikely unless falling fertility rates compensate the somewhat higher real migration.

Series D: "Low Fertility, Low Overseas Migration", addresses the possibility of a falling fertility rate, giving projections with a Total Fertility Rate beginning at 1.836 and slowing to 1.750, net migration of 70,000, and departing from a Total Population of 18,180,000 in 1996. Australia would thus have been on course to reach a total population of 24,832,400. This population would still be increasing at 0.3%.

Average Net Total Migration has been well above 70,000 in the past 10 and 20 years and topped 100,000 in 1995, the year of these base projections, and the year following that. Although there has been a slowing in total fertility rate, the European model upon which the extrapolation of this trend was based (and upon which projections by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Philip Ruddock relies - see DIMA, *Population Flows, Immigration Aspects*, December 1999, p.10, Figs 1.21 and 1.22, which provide comparisons between ABS and DIMA projections), may not be valid for Australia, but the trend is certainly falling in the short term. However in France TFT has returned to 1.70 and above from 1995 to 1998 with figures for 1995: 1.70, 1996: 1.72, 1997: 1.71 and 1998, 1.75 for the past four years. This gives an average of 1.72. The average of 1.72 goes back at least ten years. A number of the projections in this chapter will be based on a total fertility rate of 1.7. (From 1974 to 1998 the average total fertility rate was 1.81) (INSEE, "L'Evolution demographique recent", Population, 1999, no.3. Figures for 1997 and 1998 were still provisional as at 29 June in 1999)

However the comments above are based entirely on past statistical trends. These are the trends on which governments departments like town planning base their policies and plans for the future. The task of a sociologist is different, requiring social trends to be taken into consideration as well as statistical trends. Many of these factors incline one to consider the proposition that a higher population outcome, around the realm of 26-28,000,000, based on migration at or above 100,000 might be as likely as a slightly more moderate outcome around 25,000,000.

In the current political climate the will of the people is for lower migration, but money backs high migration and pressures from the housing and allied industries are enormous and reflected in the major Press. For immigration levels to fall, say to zero net, at any time in the near future seems quite unlikely. However something that might create conditions where such a trend could manifest at a date in the short term future would, in my opinion, be a major economic slump affecting Australia and the countries which are its major source of international immigration, causing

higher emigration and lower immigration. If present economic conditions accompanying the 2000 oil shock were to persist this would in my opinion provide conditions for much lower immigration settings.

Series I: "High Fertility, Zero Net Migration", gives a scenario with a Total Fertility Rate of 1.865, nil net migration, and departing from a population base in 1996 of 18,189,300. Australia would be on course to reach a total population of 20,710,000 in 2031, which would then begin to grow smaller. By 2051 it would have reached 20,170,100 and still be growing smaller at the rate of -2.4%.

The aforementioned series of projections from the ABS only projected trends for fifty years into the future. In 17 August 2000 the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) released Population Projections, Australia, 1999 to 2101, Catalogue No. 3222.0, which project forward one hundred years. In this series, the ABS projection which most closely matches Australia's present settings is Series 1, which assumes Net Overseas Migration (NOM - based on long term and permanent overseas movements) of 110,000 per annum and a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 1.75 children per woman. Under that projection, Australia's population in 2101 would be 31.9 million & still growing (at 0.21%), according to ABS. Australia's current Total Fertility Rate is 1.74. According to ABS, Australia's Net Overseas Migration was 111,200 for 1999 & 111,600 for 1998. (Total Net Migration for those years was similar; 129,444 and 84,794). Of likely future TFR trends, ABS says that "Despite the small falls in the 1990s, it is reasonable to assume that the TFR could stabilise in the 1.7 to 1.8 range, say 1.75." [p.46] However TFR could fall to 1.6 e.g. because "... higher participation rates [of women in education and in the labor force] may result in smaller families and increasing childlessness, both of which would lower the TFR." [p.46].

² Sources: Quang-Chi Dinh, *Projection de population totale pour la France métropolitaine, Base RP90. Horizons 1990-2050*, INSEE, 1995, Annexe II, p.30 and Table A5, p.139, and projections carried out privately by INSEE for the French Economic and Social Council. These were ten Population Projections from 1990 to 2040. And they compared data from both INSEE and Eurostat Series. These latter ten projections were prepared by Annie Mesrine, Direction des statistiques démographiques et sociales, Department de la démographie, Division Enquêtes et études démographiques. The file had been prepared for the attention of Mme Artiguebille, conseil économique et social, Paris. File sent to me by Suzanne Thave, Head of the Statistical Service on Foreigners at INSEE, dated and identified as Paris, 7 September 1998, No.69/F171.

What comparison of these two sources of projections shows is the small difference that immigration at levels ranging from zero net to 150,000 per annum would make. Population would stabilise and then decline in all cases, but at a higher level and later with higher amounts of immigration. The lowest population projection is for a total fertility rate of 1.5, with immigration at 50,000. This low fertility rate is quite possible and already occurs in more than one Western European country. It makes a real difference to the growth trajectory, which would be set for a steep decline. However, in France TFR has returned to 1.70 and above from 1995 to 1998 with figures for 1995: 1.70, 1996: 1.72, 1997: 1.71 and 1998, 1.75 for the past four years. This gives an average of 1.72. The average of 1.72 goes back at least ten years. A number of the projections are based on a total fertility rate of 1.7. (From 1974 to 1998 the average total fertility rate was 1.81) (INSEE, "L'Evolution démographique récente", Population, 1999, no.3. Figures for 1997 and 1998 were still provisional as at 29 June in 1999) In a more unlikely scenario, a total fertility rate of 2.1 would produce a rapidly increasing population. We can see that increased fertility makes all the difference to population growth in the French population. Immigration would have to be much higher than ever before settings to make much difference, ludicrously high in the opinion of some. See Henri Léridon's comments in his paper for the French national demographic studies organisation, INED, "Vieillesse démographique et migrations: quand les Nations unies veulent remplir le tonneau des Danaïdes ...", *Population et Sociétés*, No. 358, June 2000.

The starting populations for these graphs of projections were based on the 1990 census count of the French metropolitan population. Projections based on the 1999 census count might revise the projections slightly downwards to take into account the surprisingly small apparent population increase between 1990 and 1999.

The most likely scenario for France, going on current statistical, political and economic trends lies between the options of TFR at 1.7 and net immigration between 50,000 and 150,000, using the Eurostat series. With immigration at 50,000 this would give us a population in 2040 of 62,000,000. With immigration at 150,000 net the population might reach 66,000,000. This gives us a French population which would grow between four and eight million until around 2040/2050 when there would be quite an abrupt decline with the increasing death rate of the large baby boomer aged cohort.

My evaluation of these projections and opinions was made in the light of my own research into definition, collection, validity and reliability of demographic statistics in France and it is my considered opinion after examination of this data. It concurs with mainstream opinion in France.

³ In January 2000 an article issuing from the New York quarters of the United Nations received wide international coverage, particularly in the anglophone media. It canvassed a quite extraordinarily high immigration "solution" to Europe's aging population. Mr Joshep Chamie, Director, Population Division, United Nations, New York, NY, 10017, tel: (212) 9633179, Fax. 212 963 2147, was the spokesman for the press release, "Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to declining and Ageing Populations", 6 January, 2000 and for the final report, released on 22 March.

⁴ The following people, who have high profiles for political or business reasons, or have published books on the subject, are well known for stating this in public forums.

Phil Ruthven of IBIS business association on *Australia Talks Back*, ABC National radio, 28 August 1997; Malcolm Fraser, in an article in the *Age*, 23 October 1997, by Gervase Greene, "Immigration vital for nation's future: Fraser", was reported as saying "Australia must drastically increase its population, chiefly through immigration, if it is to protect its interests and maintain any influence ...".

On Geraldine Doogue's programme, *Life Matters* on ABC National radio, 10 June 1998, Ruthven, Ron Silberborg of the Australian Housing Industry Association, and Stephan Kerkashyrian, of the New South Wales Ethnic Affairs Commission, all spoke in favour of big populations.

Western Mining Chief, Hugh Morgan, appeared for the Australia Unlimited conference (a conference advocating a very big population for Australia) and was reported in the *Australian* on 27 April 1998. Ex Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, Tony Berg, formerly of Boral, Ron Silbermann of the Housing Industry Association also supported population growth in this forum.

On *Australia Talks Back*, ABC National Radio, Wed 10/2/1999) Nicholas McGregor and Nicholas Rothwell talked about their new book 'Future Tense', arguing for higher immigration to grow the nation and strengthen the economy. In the same year, Federal Labor MP Lindsay Tanner's new book 'Open Australia' in which he argued for higher immigration for a big population, was published and received wide coverage.

Prof Glenn Withers, Head of the Australian Public Policy Program at the Australian National University wrote an article in 'The Australian', 23 February 1999, p. 15, entitled, "Migration fits our true ideals: The new Australia needs more new Australians" In this he argued for a gross immigration intake of 190,000 per year (what he referred to as '1% of population' - 1% of 19 m = 190,000) then and rising each & every year so as to remain at the level of 1% of population. ie when Australia's population reached 20 million, the intake would be 200,000; at 30 million, the intake would be 300,000 and so forth."

In Fri 12/2/1999 Melbourne *Herald Sun*, "More Migrants, Pleads Kennett", by Christine Jackman, p.16, Victorian Premier, Jeff Kennett was quoted: "Australia's population was so low it would not even be able to defend Tasmania, Victorian Premier Jeff Kennett told a New York business lunch yesterday. ...[he] attacked immigration levels as 'almost negligible'.... 'I've got to say to you, Australia has a very low immigration program at the moment, almost negligible, about 60,000 a year,' he told the group 'I very much oppose that low level, encourage a much higher one. We've got 18 1/2 million people in all our continent - we couldn't defend Tasmania.'....".

John Nieuwenhuysen (ex director of the Australian Bureau of Immigration), in an article by himself, "There's room for more", *Herald Sun*, 12/2/1999, p. 19, subtitled: "We can't shut ourselves off from the world, says John Nieuwenhuysen"

In an article in *Civil Engineers Australia* – December 1998, entitled, "Big Population Growth Needed, Forum Told – enVision '98 Conference", Tony Berg, then Chief Executive Officer of Boral Industries, Jeff Kennett, Premier of Victoria, John White, chief executive officer of Visy Industries, Alan Stockdale, Treasurer of the Victorian Liberal Government, Dr Jack Wynhoven, chairman of the enVision 98 organising committee and chief executive officer of Connell Wagner were all described arguing for high immigration to make a big population in the enVision '98 Conference.

In an article by Lord Alistair McAlpine *The Sydney Morning Herald*, Thurs 20/7/2000, he writes, "Populate the north before the decision is forced on us" ... "The population and the preservation and the development of northern Australia are just not a possibility. It is an imperative." Lord Alistair McAlpine is a British developer and businessman who first invested in Australia 40 years ago. The article was an extract of a speech he delivered to the Brisbane Institute on Tuesday 18/7/2000.

⁵ This is a conclusion I have drawn from my research into this area and I cannot cite any particular document that specifically makes the point that the French have accepted the idea of population stabilisation. I can say that immigrationism and pronatalism, the two forms of populationism institutionalised in 1945, are no longer representative of the mainstream and barely represented at all. Responses to the recent paper UN paper on Replacement Migration, were few, but all I could locate were highly critical, of the concept and the demographic calculations. For instance see Henri Leridon, "Vieillesse démographique et migrations: quand les Nations unies veulent remplir le tonneau des Danaïdes...", *Population & Sociétés*, No. 358, Juin 2000. Another indication of this absence of populationism is to be found in one of several investigations of the problem of financing pensions for an aging population. For instance, Jean-Michel Charpin, the Minister for Planning, oversaw a government enquiry into solutions for population aging and the result was *The Future of Our Pensions (L'Avenir de nos retraites)*, Documentation Française (Electronic) April 1999. Available electronically from the French government website "La Documentation Française", <http://www.ladocfrancaise.gouv.fr/>. This is the French Government printer and publisher. In this document the idea of boosting the population through immigration is simply not even contemplated and there is only a murmur about birthrates.

⁶ But French policy and development often reflects European Economic Community member countries development, and Australian policy and development resembles that of the United States, Canada and New Zealand.

⁷ The figures are well known: In 1804 the first billion was reached; in 1927 the second billion; in 1960, the third billion; in 1974 the fourth billion; in 1987 the fifth billion and in 1999, the sixth billion. (Refer UN Population Stats.)

⁸ Oil Shocks refer to periods when global oil prices rise very steeply. The first shock in 1973 was due to the oil producing countries, OPEC, forming a cartel, which forced oil importing countries to purchase oil at a very high price. Since the end of the coal era industrialised nations' economies have depended more and more on oil, which is much more efficient than coal. Since the oil shock newly industrialising countries, with huge populations, like China, India and South East Asia, have become much more dependent on oil as well. Population growth and growth in consumption of industrialised produced goods which rely on high energy consumption mean that the world fears running out of cheap oil. This is because there is no cheap substitute currently available that can replace all of oil's functions. It is rumoured that the 1999-2000 oil shock may be linked to real resource supply problems in the face of growing demand and draw-down on established fields. Sources: The Australian National Geographic Encyclopedia of Australia, 1986, "Oil and Natural Gas", p.2295. The definition and history of shocks and "counter shocks" can become quite complicated, see for example, Nicolas Sarkis, "Pétrole, le troisième choc?" (The Third Oil Shock?), in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 2000, p.1 (My translation) "Within the space of 27 years, between 1973 and 2000, the world oil market has been shaken by two major "shocks" and "counter shocks". To these should be added mini-shocks – always unexpected. Expressed in 1973 dollars, the price of petrol has almost quadrupled since the day after the October war of 1973 - \$2.67 per barrel in 1972 to \$9.82 in 1974. Prices reached an historical record of \$17.13 in 1982, following the Islamic revolution in Iran, before being divided by three subsequent to the first counter shock of 1985-1986. The second major countershock of 1998 was marked by a fall in prices of 34.3%, followed in 1999 by a recovery to 42.2%. Despite that rise, and before the sudden rise at the beginning of 1999 took the cost of crude to around \$30, 1999 prices never went above (in 1974 dollars) half of their 1974 level." (We can of course now observe that in 2000 they are well above this 1999 level.) This article also suggested that oil production may peak in 2005. For more on this see, <http://www.oilcrisis.com/gas/> which has articles by well known oil geologists and links to discussions on when oil will peak, the impact of this, and the viability of various substitutes.

⁹ H Martin and H Schumann, *The Global Trap*, Pluto Press, London, New York, 1997, pp108-110.

¹⁰ This is well documented and the subject of frequent newspaper commentary, but see, for instance, Jeanette Money, *Fences and Neighbours*, Cornell University Press, 1999, pp10-13.

¹¹ Alexis Spire, "Asile politique 121,000 réfugiés vivent en France", in *INSEE Première*, No. 601, July 1998 and Joanne Kinslor, "Sending Asylum Seekers Elsewhere: Recent Developments in Australian 'Safe Third Country' Law, *People and Place*, Vol. 8, No.2, 2000, pp53-68.

¹² In Australia this issue is not very prevalent, see Birrell and Birrell, *An Issue of People*, Longman Cheshire, 1987, pp30-39.

¹³ Examples are The Australian Population Institute (APOPOP), www.apop.com.au, the Housing Industry Association (HIA), www.buildingonline.com.au (follow links to 'industry information' then 'immigration') and the Business Council of Australia (BCA), www.bca.com.au (see menu for 'Population Policy', 'Sustainable Development' and 'BCA Papers', which contains texts of three issues which each have articles about population.) The Australian newspaper is also a supporter of population growthism and co-hosted the growthist conference "Australia Unlimited" in 1998 along with many manufacturing and other business concerns. The Housing Industry of Australia co-published, with Allen and Unwin, a book written by Steven Castles, William Foster, and Glen Withers, *Immigration in Australia*. This is a series of research articles which favor population growth for Australia. See also Jeanette Money, *Fences and Neighbors*, Cornell University Press, 1999, p.167.

¹⁴ This is less the case in France than in Australia. Unlike the situation in Australia and the US, legal defense of immigrants is not yet big business in France. Illegals theoretically have the right to free legal aid, but don't often use this, perhaps because the legal profession tends to be quite conservative on these issues. In France the "Chevenement law" on immigration of June 1998 required that a motive be supplied for visa refusals for certain categories of applicants. These categories were spouses and parents of French citizens, beneficiaries of family reunion, foreigners with working permits, and students in higher education. According to the Minister for foreign affairs in 2000, this change in the law gave rise to a strong increase in appeals against visa refusals. The number rose from 10 appeals in 1997 to 1000 in 1999. Compared to the number of appeals processed in Australia - which run to thousands *per month* - this is small potatoes. Sources: *Le Monde*, 2 February 2000, "Des demandes en augmentation" (author and page number not available) and the Australian Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Tribunal. The Migration Review Tribunal recorded cases lodged between 1 July 1999 and 30 April 2000 as 5052. The Refugee Review Tribunal recorded at year ended 30/5/2000, 40,060 appeals lodged.

¹⁵ Not to mention the growing difficulties experienced by the former communist states.

¹⁶ Pronatalism had been a strong force in Australian politics from the 1890s, at least, but after the Second World War it found its focus in the Santamaria led "Movement" (also known as "The Groupers"). The Movement had members from both Liberal and Labor Parties, mostly among Catholics. However members of the movement came into conflict

within the Labor Party, resulting in the formation of a new break away party, the Democratic Labor Party. Most groupers, who were the major pronatalists in the ALP, allied with the DLP. This party failed to succeed in its own right and fell into obscurity, and the pronatalist movement with it. The "Movement" did regroup, this time without Vatican support, and survives in different organizations today, including the National Civic Council and The Australian Family Association. There are currently signs of pronatalism gaining some support in the major political parties again. Sources: Paul Ormond, *The Movement*, Nelson, 1968 and Robert Murray, *The Split, Australian Labor in the Fifties*, Cheshire, 1970.

In France pronatalist policy lasted until the late 1970s and virtually lost all currency with change of government in 1982. See, for instance, Dupaquier, *Histoire de la population française*, Vol.4, de 1914 à nos jours, Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, p.195, Table 29, "Evolution du barème des allocations familiales selon le rang de l'enfant, depuis 1938" (en proportion du salaire mensuel de base). Policies became far more needs based.

¹⁷ Gary Freeman in Freeman, Gary P., *Immigrant Labour and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies, the French and British Experience, 1945-1975*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1979, pp.69-80.

¹⁸ Some writers who credit the French program as having retained nation-building purpose are Alec G. Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'race' and ethnicity in contemporary France*, Routledge, 1995, pp10-11; James F. Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.55. Here he also contrasts the links between immigration policy and nation building in France with the absence of these in Germany, which did not have the same history of concern about population decline; Ralph Schor, *Histoire de l'immigration en France de la fin du XIXe siècle à nos jours*, Armand Colin, 1996, pp 195-196; Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, Paris, 1989, p.14: writes that the objectives of the immigration program in 1946 were clear and included the objective of returning to a bigger population. She adds that use of a State monopoly, the ONI to recruit foreign workers and the establishment of an official link between population policy and immigration (the Ministry of Public Health and Population which was advised by the High Committee of Population) underscores this commitment.

In Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, Paris, 1989, p.15 and Jacques Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française: Vol.4: De 1914 à nos jours*: p.472, it is noted that the principle of family immigration was established in a decree on 24 December 1945 and later confirmed in a circular by the Minister of Public Health and Population on 20 January 1947 which confirmed the political will to encourage permanent settlement of immigrants. The role of the OMI in facilitating family reunion where appropriate lodgings were available was set out in a circular dated 20 January 1947. The progressive nature of the three kinds of residents' permits and the corresponding acquisition of social and civil rights was a system originally designed to encourage fertile immigrants of the "right type". The three tiered hierarchy of permanence in residents' permits and the decentralised administration of applications and renewals is a system which can permit discretionary fulfillment of the intentions with which they were originally designed. These intentions were to facilitate permanent settlement of desirable individuals of an age to have children - less than 35 years old.

Monique Hervo and Marie-ange Charras, *Bidonvilles*, Cahiers libres 219-220, Cahiers Libres 219-220, Librairie François Maspero, 1971, p.338, write about immigrants in Bidonvilles being urged to take on French nationality in order to get a house. They surmise that this is because of France's population building designs and cite M. Massenet, November 1968, No. 761, *Hommes et migrations, Documents*, who wrote that the apotheosis of immigration policy was for the immigrant to naturalise.

¹⁹ *The Australian Encyclopaedia*, Australian Geographic Pty Ltd, Terrey Hills, NSW, Australia, 6th Edition, 1996, "Mineral Industry", pp.2090-2093. There was an embargo placed on the export of iron ore in 1938 because there were believed to be very limited reserves. It was not until 1949 that a series of important new ore discoveries began. In 1950 the value of mineral exports was \$69 million. In 1980 it was \$6802 million. "It was not until 1965 that the mineral industry produced what was probably the first favourable balance of overseas mineral trade in the twentieth century." (p.2092) Gold and some other precious metals have been traditional fallbacks in tough times but the high export role of gold, silver and copper and tin between the 1850s and the 1890s waned considerably after 1910. Gold production had a temporary revival in the 1930s and then did not greatly feature in the economy until after 1950. Also see various histories of Australia's mining industry, for instance, Rick Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning, The Story of Australia's Oil Industry*, David El Press, 1983.

²⁰ This is a major difference between the federal system of government (as in Australia) and the unitary system of government (as in France). Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, Development and housing are regulated by States and local governments in Australia. (Per Terry Burke, personal communication, an interesting exception to this was where the Chifflay government did at one stage bring in an Australia wide regulation that no house could be more than 12 squares, due to shortages of building materials.) Later the Whitlam government was to attempt to synchronize planning at the State level by influencing it from the federal level, principally through funding inducements. I go into these matters further on in this paper.

²¹ Despite a pro-high immigration stance in the Liberal Country Party coalition and their planned intake of 140,000 for 1971-72, net immigration was less than 50,000 in 1972. This is attributable to emigration, reflecting continuing difficulties in retaining immigrants. High outward immigration of all categories began in 1969 and continued until 1980. In December 1972 the ALP came in with a policy to cut immigration, although they had a very positive attitude to immigrant welfare. The Minister for Immigration, Al Grassby, under the Whitlam government, was actually in favor of quite high immigration, but, according to Birrell and Birrell, *An Issue of People*, Longman Cheshire, 1987, pp 86-87, his recommendations for planned intakes were all "chopped back". Nevertheless 1974 net immigration was as high as that of 1971. With the recession hitting very hard in 1975 there was low intake and high emigration continued. Sources for emigration data: ABS Year Books, 1971, 1979, 1982, 1988, "Overseas Arrivals and Departures" and "Categories of Overseas Departures", ABS Australian Demographic Statistics, 3101.0, June Qtr., 1984, June Qtr., 1989, Dec. Qtr. 1993, Dec. Qtr., 1996.

²² Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies*, Princeton University Press, 1979, and "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States", *International Migration Review*, vol. 24, no.4, 1995, pp.881-901.

²³ *Ibid*, p.885 : Here Freeman cites Wilson, J.Q., ed., *The Politics of Regulation*, Harper, New York, 1980, "The analysis in this section builds on the framework devised by James Q. Wilson that derives four types of politics from whether the benefits and costs of policies are concentrated or diffuse: client (cb,dc), interest group (cb,cc), majoritarian (db,dc), and entrepreneurial (db,cc)."

²⁴ *Ibid*, p.892. In defence of France, in Freeman's argument the French are not cast as more racist than Australians or Americans; it is only in the absence of strong pro-immigration lobbies that racialism seems more influential and if you don't take their economic reasons seriously, which I do.

²⁵ *Ibid*, pp885-886.

²⁶ *Ibid*, pp.881-901

²⁷ *Ibid*, p 881. He later gives a number of examples of these "unfortunate consequences" on pages 890 & 892. . Some of these include the complications of decolonisation, unforeseen consequences of guestworker programs, and conflicts associated with ethnic and religious minorities, such as the muslim scarf conflict in schools in the French lay State, conflicts over the practice of female circumcision, domestic political flack over the Gulf war.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p.890, note 9, "In the immediate postwar period, the French government considered launching a program of permanent immigration in order to remedy the demographic deficit caused by war losses and long-term population decline. The program was never fully implemented and a temporary manpower strategy quickly supplanted it." He cites Tapinos, *L'immigration étrangère en France 1946-1973*, Paris, PUF, 1975 and his own work, Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945-1975*, Princeton, N J, 1979.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p.892. In this article it would have been good if he had tried to articulate the difference between international immigration and Moslem immigration as an internal immigration issue by French nationals, since Algeria was, up to 1962, a part of France, and its nationals retained special rights in France until 1968 and children born to those Algerians who were once French still retain naturalization rights. He also does not articulate the definitional problem of the many legal and statistical differences between "worker immigration" of mostly non-European origin and immigration from within the European Economic Community. Nor does he explain why family reunion is a legal issue in European law and how this affects and affected the ability of France and other EU member-states' "failure of governments to halt immigration in 1973 and the indecisiveness with which they responded in the aftermath of 1973...".

³⁰ For instance, Brimelow, *Alien Nation*, Random House, New York, 1995, pp173-175.

³¹ In fact this could be described as a major difference between the Western States of the Old World that was once part of the Roman Empire and the New English Speaking World.

³² Gary Freeman, "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States", *International Migration Review*, vol. 24, no.4, 1995, pp885-886.

³³ This is not to say that the building industry in France does not import workers. See Jeanette Money, *Fences and Neighbors*, Cornell University Press, 1999, p.149 who says that the Federation Parisien du Batiment (FPB) stood in sharp contrast to the CNPF (Chambre de Commerce et de l'Industrie de Paris), in pushing for high immigration up to

1975. In fact this assertion is contradicted by Patrick Weil, in *La France et ses Etrangers*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, p.77-81, who writes that the CNPF expressed fears that, not only were poor countries organising into an oil cartel, their workers were also negotiating higher prices. As the economic situation worsened however the CNPF stopped protesting, but Weil attributes the one year lag on Germany by France regarding closure of borders, to manufacturer protest. However, regarding the FPB; it was looking for short term construction workers and the reason they still wanted them in 1974 is that the industry, although it was going into rapid decline, was still holding on in the private sector. However economic circumstances caught up here as well. Construction, as everywhere in the world, tends to profit from short term immigration and in France much of this is illegal immigration. In Australia we tend to import construction tradesmen and have done since the Second World War, due mainly to our great failure to train young Australians. In France the supply of tradesmen is considered more or less adequate. See Note 98.

³⁴ Jeannette Money, *Fences and Neighbors*, The Political Geography of Immigration Control, Cornell University Press, 1999, pp 128, 139, 149-151, 153, 155. Immigration sociologist, Jeanette Money, in *Fences and Neighbours*, has commented on some of the differences in approaches to housing immigrants and the impact this may have had in sensitising local politicians who also hold positions in National French politics, but she has not remarked upon the absence of a development and housing industry lobby for high immigration in France. Money also uses Gary Freeman's approach, but her focus is on identifying immigration impact at a local level. She believes costs are focused in neighbourhoods with a high proportion of immigrants, but does not compare the presence and absence of roles of industry lobbies at a national level in response to benefits or absence of benefits from immigration.

³⁵ D.Burtenshaw, M.Bateman and G.J.Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, Toronto, 1981, p.ix.

³⁶ For instance, almost all E.O. Wilson's works, of which a good inclusive example is *Naturalist*, Penguin, 1994, and which cites Robert MacArthur and E O Wilson, *The Theory of Island Biogeography*, Princeton University Press, 1967, as a crucial advance in conservation biology using geographical ecology. It looks at the viability of biodiverse areas according to their size and location and isolation. Much work has built on this theory. Other examples are William Lines, *False Economy*, (which is quite a sociological approach to the impacts of population growth in Australia on human experience and environmental richness) Freemantle Arts Centre Press, 1998, Tim Flannery, *The Future Eaters*, Reed Books, 1994, Mary White, *After the Greening, the Browning*, 1994, RD Graetz, MA Wilson, SK Campbell, *Landcover Disturbance Over the Australian Continent*, Biodiversity Series Paper No.7, Dept Environment, Sports and Territories, Commonwealth of Australia, ISBN, 0642229058.

³⁷ At the end of 1999 there was conflict between ecologists and shepherds in France over whether wolves, which were increasing in number for the first time this century, should be allowed a permanent niche France with their status protected through national land planning. (The following passages cited were translated by myself.)

On the site of Univers-Nature, <http://www.univers-nature.com/>, in November 2000 there was a special report on the return of big predators in France. "Today it appears that conditions for definitive reinstatement of big predators are optimum. The rural exodus and the shrinking of agriculture have created less human population pressure and forests are increasing. Restrictions on hunting have also permitted better management of big wild herbivores. Moreover public opinion has demonstrated through several polls that most people favor the long term return of big predators in our land."

The web site of the French Society for the Protection of Mammals, <http://www.mnhn.fr/sfepm/index.html>, reports that on the 25th of October the 23rd Francophone Mammalogy Conference responded to a parliamentary report on the Wolf, dated 20 October. Their response denounced the report's failure to come to terms with the wolf's reestablishment in France and to be mistakenly privileging the economically moribund French sheep industry over the rights of wolves to return to their natural home.... "The report contents itself with simplistic solutions; eradication or imprisonment of the Wolf in zoos, justified by traditional bogies about the species. But people should remember that if the Wolf has a reputation for eating grandmothers and Little Red Riding Hoods, it is also a model of social structure, founder of ancient Rome and thus of our civilisation. Furthermore, aren't wolf-cubs still part of numerous youth movements?"

³⁸ For instance, both Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux in *De L'Immigre au citoyen*, La Documentation Francaise, Paris, 1989, pp 72-81 and Patrick Weil in *La France et ses immigrés*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, pp 100-102 and 270-276, have allocated analytical space to the issue of planning and housing. Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, p.75 writes that the shape of immigration in France was largely determined by housing and urban housing politics. Books have been written in France specifically on the connection between homelessness, inferior housing and immigration, such as Monique Hervo and Marie-Ange Charras, *Bidonvilles*, Cahiers Libres 219-220, Librairie François Maspero, 1971.

³⁹ Leonie Sandercock, *The Land Racket*, (for the Australian Association of Socialist Studies), A Silverfish Book, ISBN 0 908094 43 4, p 82.

⁴⁰ Barry J Simpson, *Planning and Public Transport in Great Britain, France and West Germany*, Longman Scientific & Technical, 1987, pp 70 and 83. In France national and regional planning is well developed. These plans are used to guide land use and transport policies at a more local scale

⁴¹ Switzerland is unique in that it also holds national referendums on immigration. Source: Gary Freeman, "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States", *International Migration Review*, vol. 24, no.4, 1995, pp.881-901

⁴² The Swedish example has been used as a strong contrast between British land development practices which permit massive speculation and the Swedish ones that don't in Peter Dickens, Simon Duncan, Mark Goodwin and Fred Gray, *Housing, States and Localities*, Methuen, London & New York, 1985. Leonie Sandercock, *The Land Racket*, (for the Australian Association of Socialist Studies), A Silverfish Book, ISBN 0 908094 43 4, p. 82 writes, "Experience in the country which has been most successful in land policy reform (Sweden) suggests that any program of State intervention on the supply side in the land market must be of a long term nature. In Stockholm as early as 1904 the city purchased 2000 hectares of surrounding development land at a time when the developed area was only 1700 hectares, and three years later legislation was introduced which permitted municipalities to dispose of land only on a leasehold basis, in order to maintain planning control and to discourage speculation. This process continued until almost all the remaining undeveloped land had been acquired, some 12, 600 hectares by the outbreak of World War II. In 1967, continuing this tradition of an active land policy, Sweden decided that local authorities should control all future development in advance of need. Despite slow and cumbersome acquisition procedures, advance land acquisition policies appear to have stabilized land values and encouraged coherent planning policies."

⁴³ Leonie Sandercock compares and contrasts United Kingdom planning and building with Australia in Leonie Sandercock, *The Land Racket*, (for the Australian Association of Socialist Studies), A Silverfish Book, ISBN 0 908094 43 4, PP 80-83. Here she also compares Britain with Sweden, over the period 1967 to 1970, where the British Labor Government, using the Land Commission Act of 1967, provided for the establishment of a central authority to assemble land banks for prospective development and generally to acquire, manage and dispose of land in the interests of the community. (The Act did not survive the change of government in 1970.) In British "new towns", says Sandercock, p.83, as in Canberra, "the development authorities own all the land and take all the development decisions and the market has almost no direct influence in determining land use. But both the new towns and Canberra are only a small proportion of the urban development occurring in Britain and Australia and the enlightened development planning approach in use in them must be regarded as somewhat of an aberration from the dominant free enterprise dictated development process occurring throughout the rest of Britain and Australia."

⁴⁴ This post 1973 oil shock European Community policy of zero net immigration, which did not occur in Australia, Canada or the US, came to be nicknamed "Fortress Europe". Fortress Europe had evolved out of the Treaty of Rome of 1957. This treaty permitted visa free travel to citizens of the European Economic Community. The original signatories were France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Italy and West Germany. The United Kingdom and Denmark were added in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. The Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992 made the European Economic Community into the European Union. In 1994 Austria, Finland and Switzerland were added.

⁴⁵ Guy Groux and Catherine Lévy, *La Possession Ouvrière, du taudis à la propriété, (XIXe-XXe siècle)*, Les Éditions de l'Atelier, pp104-112., INSEE, *Données sociales*, 1993, Figure 4, "Logements terminés par secteur de construction de 1949 a 1977 p.411. Housing Construction Totals from 1979-1989 were from INSEE, *Annuaire Rétrospectif de la France, 1948-1988*, Table 1, "Situation de la Construction". Original Source, Ministère de l'Équipement, du logement, des transports et de la Mer. From 1980-1994 my source was Maurice Blanc and Laurence Bertrand, "France", *Housing Policy in Europe*, Ed. Paul Balchin, Routledge, 1996, Table 9.2, p.127. (Figures for 1994 were provisional).

⁴⁶ D Burtenshaw, M Bateman, G J Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley & Sons, 1981, and *The European City, A Western Perspective*, David Fulton Publishers, London, 1991 and Barry J Simpson, *Planning and Public Transport in Great Britain, France and West Germany*, Longman Scientific & Technical, 1987, pp 70 and 83.

⁴⁷ Leonie Sandercock, *The Land Racket*, (for the Australian Association of Socialist Studies), A Silverfish Book, ISBN 0 908094 43 4, p 82. See also, Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, p. 19.

⁴⁸ This lack of change in the Australian industry is mainly detectable by comparing literature on the industry adaptations in France and Europe. Little change, except higher prices, is evident in the Australian literature of the time, but in the European literature there are many references to adaptations post oil shock economic crisis. See, for instance, Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, p.18, who talks about the different systems in Europe and the English speaking settler countries, including Australia. On p.32 he comments that developers in

Australia frequently employ a strategy of "inviting as many builders as possible to set up display houses. Some have up to 60 different builders working on their estate at any one time. This fragmentation not only limits the degree to which the builders can appropriate development gains, but also further restricts their ability to embark on more industrialised forms of production techniques that might occur on site." See also Gavin McCrone and Mark Stephens, *Housing Policy in Britain and Europe*, UCL Press, 1995, p.23, Chapter 3, "Housing Policy in France", "French housing policy has undergone considerable changes in recent years, but the process has been more evolutionary than the abrupt changes of direction that have characterised the UK. ... As in other countries, the impetus for many of the changes since the mid-1970s has been the need to contain costs and to target the measures more effectively...". See also Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages). This plots the course of the housing construction industry in France from WW2 and documents a number of industry and design adjustments to energy and financial strictures after the oil shock.

⁴⁹ Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, Viking, 1986, pp. 387-405 and Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, p.19.

⁵⁰ Some examples of protest groups are Save Our Suburbs (SOS) which has the political disadvantage of defending isolated middle class pockets from increased population density housing without addressing the overall cause of population growth; Australians for an Ecologically Sustainable Population (AESP), which has little money, but highly articulate supporters in the ecological scientific community and which gave rise to its counterpart, the pro-immigration APOP : www.apop.com.au , created by industries in support of high immigration; and Australians Against Further Immigration (AAFI) and the more widely based Pauline Hanson Party which have been morally invalidated by allegations of racist sympathies. See Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, Transaction Publishers, 1990, p.269, and elsewhere for an examination of groups attempting to stop Australian development and housing and how isolated they have been.

⁵¹ See Notes 4 & 13.

⁵² Algeria had unilaterally ceased immigration in 1973 giving the reason as racialism, one year prior to France closing her borders. With the rise in oil prices, the CNPF expressed fears that Algeria was withdrawing not only oil, in line with OPEC, but that her workers were organising to negotiate higher wages as well. See Patrick Weil, *La France et ses Etrangers*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, p.77-81, for an interesting discussion of other reasons and the role of OPEC.

⁵³ [Gisti-info] Le statut des étudiants étrangers: "Entre maîtrise des flux migratoires et logique de Marché", Tuesday 4 April 2000 from gisti-info@ras.eu.org. This was an email article from Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés (GISTI) – The Group for Information and Support for Immigrants, 3, Villa Marces 75011, Paris. Tel. 0143146066. Also Students, who have visas for less than one year (unless they are from the European Union) are not counted as permanent immigrants, although they may stay for several years and may be allowed to work.

⁵⁴ D Burtenshaw, M Bateman, G J Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley & Sons, 1981, and *The European City, A Western Perspective*, David Fulton Publishers, London, 1991. These books highlight and contrast the careful central planning of European cities after 1945 compared to US cities. They describe and analyse planning in various regions and cities including French ones and go into the subject of public and private housing in some comparative detail.

⁵⁵ Barry J Simpson, *Planning and Public Transport in Great Britain, France and West Germany*, Longman Scientific & Technical, 1987, pp 70 and 83. In France national and regional planning is well developed. These plans are used to guide land use and transport policies at a more local scale

⁵⁶ 1995 *Encyclopaedia Universalis France* S.A., "Logement (Politique du)": "La Constitution de réserves foncières" and "L'expropriation et la préemption".

⁵⁷ 1997 *Encyclopaedia Universalis France*, S.A., "SAFER": Agricultural land must be sold through the SAFERs (Sociétés d'aménagement foncier et d'établissement rural) and only for agricultural purposes. These SAFERs were established by law in 1962. Their purpose is to retain and improve agricultural land and to repackage it, usually in larger allotments.

⁵⁸ *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems" Housing Studies, Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, p. 19. "Almost all housing texts and studies analyse housing issues separately from land issues. The cost of a dwelling and its associated affordability and location issues are intrinsically related to the cost and availability of land, yet rarely does any analysis of land filter into housing studies. Those who own land, and the procedures for its development, shape housing policy directly and indirectly. Thus, it is often overlooked that the ability of the social housing sector in many European countries both to expand

and to provide affordable housing is due to the fact that sizeable components of urban land were owned by government or non-profit organizations." ... "By contrast, public housing in Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada, has been constructed on private land for which market prices have had to be paid."

⁵⁹ Department of Infrastructure, *Review of Development Contributions*, Draft Report and Recommendations, June 2000. This is a review of the Victorian Planning and Environment Act 1987, amendment 1995, no.50 of 1995 incorporating Part 3(b), "Development Contributions". The review has been undertaken by Jennifer Bowden and Art Truter of the Dept of Infrastructure, Victoria. It makes some comparisons with similar Acts in Queensland and New South Wales. Under Section 173 of the Planning and Environment Act or the general power to attach conditions to development approvals, it was possible for Councils to enforce requirements for development contributions. However, these processes were subject to case by case challenge. The Act was amended in November 1995 to give Councils the option of preparing formal Development Contribution Plans (DCP's) for incorporation into their planning schemes. This was intended to provide a more predictable and fair system for developers and councils alike. These DCP provisions are the main focus of this review. What the review finds is that councils often have not known where to start in negotiations for "contributions" with developers, costs from council to council have varied greatly and, in fact, few councils have actually gone ahead with this process. Where councils do negotiate an agreement with developers this may be subject to cumbersome scheme amendment process every time they wish to adjust their DCP's. "This problem is compounded by the fact that the Planning and Environment Act effectively mandates the preparation of DCP's as the only legitimate means of levying contributions. While many Councils have been happy to continue with the S173 approach to date, there is also a realisation that this is risky. If a developer were to refuse to enter into an agreement and have the matter heard by VCAT, the developer could reasonably argue that no infrastructure contributions should be required of them because the Council had failed to use the 'proper mechanism' under the planning legislation for setting up a development contribution policy." In other words it has proved very difficult to get private developers to pay the councils' costs and the costs to the neighbourhood, for instance in loss of amenity, etc.

⁶⁰ A notable exception is the Premier of New South Wales, Bob Carr. See Mark O'Connor, *This Tired Brown Land*, Duffy and Snellgrove, 1998, p.18. The more usual view is exemplified by such as the Lord Mayor of Brisbane, Jim Soorley, who told the press that Australia needed to triple its population in the next 20 years (p.17). In Fri 12/2/1999 Melbourne *Herald Sun*, "More Migrants, Pleads Kennett", by Christine Jackman, p. 16, Victorian Premier, Jeff Kennet was reported, not for the first time, claiming that Australia could not survive economically without a much bigger population.

⁶¹ The Federal Assistance Grant is allocated to local councils on the basis of population numbers and need.

⁶² *Lifelines, Bulletin of the Community Biodiversity Network*, Vol 6. No.1. 2000, Centre for Biodiversity and Conservation Research, Australian Museum, 6 College Street, Sydney, NSW, 2000, pp 1 & 11. This issue has a lot of information on the rate of land clearing in the various Australian states and the number of species threatened by the accompanying loss of habitat. The web page is www.cbn.org.au

⁶³ This costly legal recourse is known as "injurious affection" and the legislation involved used to be the Planning and Environment Act. It has been replaced by the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (came into force 30 March 1998). This latest Act provides a procedure for awarding compensation for those who are affected by changes to a planning scheme. An owner of land is entitled to reasonable compensation if 1) the value of their interest in the land is reduced because of a change to a planning scheme or policy affecting the land AND 2) they have made an application within two years of the change, for development under the superceded scheme; AND 3) the application is refused or only partially and/or conditionally approved (s.5.4.2). The compensation provisions present a dilemma for a local government in introducing new planning restrictions. Should it expose the Council to compensation payouts or should it accept that the new restrictions will have to be phased in? The danger of phasing in the new provisions is that the ability to achieve the objective of the new planning restriction may be undermined by allowing development under the old scheme to continue for two years.

⁶⁴ Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 7: The Land Development and House Building Industries, pp.27-29

⁶⁵ Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Land Development and House Building Industries," Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, p.31-32 & 35.

⁶⁶ Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 7: The Land Development and House Building Industries, p.34, Table 4, "Examples of Trading in Zoned Raw Land on Melbourne's Urban Fringe in the late 1980s", which shows increases in land prices of over 100 per cent in less than 12 months through rezoning and land trading. Also see Terry Burke, "Housing and Poverty", Chapter 8, pp.165-185, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998, p. 174, Fig.8.1. "Australia: Required Annual Income to Purchase

Median-priced House (real threshold income) 1972-1995 and Shane Nugent, "Why Sydney Keeps Growing – Trends in Population Distribution in New South Wales, 1991-1996, *People and Place*, vol.6, no.4, pp 24-32, "There were significant increases in housing costs in Sydney in the late 1980s. This may have either forced some people out of Sydney due to lack of affordable housing and/or encouraged some to profit from selling their Sydney house to move elsewhere for lifestyle reasons. House price increases in Sydney in the 1990s have generally been much slower."

⁶⁷ Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 7: The Land Development and House Building Industries, pp31-32.

⁶⁸ See Note 65 and Sandercock, *The Land Racket: the real costs of property speculation*, Silverfish 1979, Sandercock, *Property Politics and Urban Planning*, Transaction Publishers, 1990, Groux & Levy, *La Possession Ouvriere*, Les Editions de l'Atelier, 1993, and Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, 1972-1975*, Viking, 1985, the chapter "Cities", Burtenshaw, Bateman and Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley and Sons, 1981.

⁶⁹ Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, Viking, 1986, Chapter entitled, "The Cities", esp. P.382-392. See also references to DURD in Tom Uren, *Straight Left*, Vintage, 1995, and Leone Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, Transaction publishers, 1990, pp11-20.

⁷⁰ Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, Viking, 1986, p.403. As Sandercock points out frequently in both her cited works, Liberal governments have been ever vigilant to preserve the advantages accrued from private property.

⁷¹ Gavin McCrone and Mark Stephens, *Housing Policy in Britain and Europe*, UCL Press, 1995, pp.26. "Approximately half of the owner occupiers in France are paying a mortgage, the remainder owning their houses outright. The expansion of the sector has been encouraged by a wide range of subsidized loans, to the extent that in the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of new building was assisted in this way. Since 1977 the forms of assistance have been rationalized into three main schemes: PAP loans, PC loans, [and] PEL loans." The last one is a subsidized housing savings scheme. "In addition there are grants to assist with house improvement and a limited scheme of mortgage interest tax relief. PAP loans can be provided both for new building and to assist with the costs of improvements to existing dwellings. They are subsidized by the State and administered ...principally ... by ... a State-controlled institution that raises funds in the private market... "PC loans, or regulated loans... are regulated rather than subsidized, but rates of interest, although now fairly close to market rates, have in the past been significantly lower. This is because of the privileged access the institutions have had to low-cost finance, in particular current accounts (on which interest payment is prohibited in France) and the funds generated by the housing savings scheme, which involve an indirect subsidy and tax relief....They are normally on a fixed interest basis with a term of 10-20 years. ... "

⁷² The elected public housing bodies are called Groupes de Représentation des locataires des HLMs (Group representing HLM tenants). These management associations are mixed "economic societies", meaning some of their money may be public and some from private investment. For instance the private investment may come from any source but the public funds could come from social welfare funds, such as family allowances. The HLM management societies are managed by a counsel composed of representatives of financial investors and representatives of tenants. The tenants' representatives are elected, but the investors' representatives are salaried. Because of the incursions by the National Front into these counsels a law was evoked whereby an association of tenants could not hide a political party. Christine Garin, "L'Extrême droit subit un revers aux élections des représentations des locations HLM", *Le Monde*, 4 January 2000.

⁷³ HLM: "Habitation a loyer modere". Low rent public housing (usually high rise).

⁷⁴ Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, Paris, 1989 pp.75-76, and Patrick Weil, *La France et ses immigrés*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, 270-273 write of quota systems and agreements, some of which were official, especially at a local level, to avoid concentrations of immigrants of more than between 10-25% and by replacing a family of immigrants with another family of immigrants. The informal system even came to treat non-mainlander French people, e.g. from Guyana, who were not white as part of such quotas. Housing shortages with the petrol shock exacerbated the associated lodging problems for immigrants, as has family reunion. Christine Garin, "L'Extrême droit subit un revers aux élections des représentations des locations HLM", *Le Monde*, 4 January 2000. In reaction to the National Front's growing involvement in the management of public housing through local elections, in 1997 laws were passed to make the FN's continuing involvement in such affairs much more difficult.

⁷⁵ Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, p.21.

⁷⁶ Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, 1989, p.76-77

⁷⁷ <http://www.france2.fr/legislatives/partifn.htm>, accessed on 19/6/00 9:53 am. This was on the home page of the French television channel 2, under the banner, "Legislative Elections 25 May- 1 June 1997, "The National Front's platform", "Housing, family, health". Under this heading was also included the objective of prioritising access for French families to public housing.

⁷⁸ It is important to understand (as mentioned on page 4) throughout this paper that "immigration" in this context means workers and their families from poor countries outside the EEC. The rich, famous, and talented from outside the union had less trouble. Members of the EEC were completely free to travel.

⁷⁹ In 1960 housing allowances made up 5.7% of total family allowances disbursed. In the early 1970s this had increased to 13.4% with several complimentary laws came into being whereby allocation of public housing firmly prioritized low incomes and larger families. HLM management was legally obliged to award priority to the largest families with the smallest incomes. The recession in 1973 imposed budgetary constraints of itself. The rise in unemployment increased demand on the State social security coffers. New areas of need developed and social policy was refocused again, targeting allowances to combat poverty and drifting ever further from the old goal of encouraging large families. Between 1959 and 1974 the amount of contributions to finance family allowances had nearly halved from 16.75% to 9%. In 1988 it was reduced again.

In 1982 the new socialist government brought about big changes in family policy, effectively ending traditional pronatalist policy.

⁸⁰ Gavin McCrone and Mark Stephens, *Housing Policy in Britain and Europe*, UCL Press, 1995, pp.24-25. "As supply caught up with demand and the costs of the policy became increasingly burdensome, it was felt that the support was not sufficiently targeted on those who most needed it. The 1975 Barre Report, which recommended a shift from bricks and mortar subsidies to support for the individual through housing allowances, and the subsequent legislation of January 1977, therefore marked a watershed in the development of French housing policy. ... Since then there has been a gradual but marked reduction in assistance to bricks and mortar through subsidized loans, in both real and nominal terms, and a switch to personal housing allowances. ... In the private rented sector, both the assistance and the level of construction declined, and in the social rented sector there was a more gradual fall in the amount of support: the level of activity fell from 1974 onwards, until by 1980 it was about half its previous level. ... However, despite the reductions in bricks and mortar subsidies, the costs of housing policy have continued to escalate as a result of the increased proportion of relatively poor people, the larger number of retired, and increased rates of unemployment."

⁸¹ Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, Paris, 1989, pp.76-80. Costa-Lascoux describes the interactions of housing shortage, immigrant slums, and competition for government assistance, made very public through the violent conflicts that arose in the public housing estates.

⁸² See Patrick Weil, *La France et ses Etrangers*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, p.77-81, for an interesting discussion of other reasons, the role of OPEC, and the reaction of the Confédération nationale du patronat français (CNPF). The CNPF expressed fears that, not only were poor countries organising into an oil cartel, their workers were also negotiating higher prices. As the economic situation worsened however the CNPF stopped protesting, but Weil attributes the one year lag on Germany by France regarding closure of borders, to manufacturer protest.

⁸³ Ralph Schor, *Histoire de l'immigration en France*, pp.226-227. Patrick Weil, *La France et ses Etrangers*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, p.78 & 88. "Bidonvilles" was the term used to describe the slums inhabited mainly by immigrants that arose at city outskirts in France, especially in the north-east of Paris. Such a bidonville was at Nanterre. The 1968 student revolt began in Nanterre and was accompanied by manifestations of student solidarity with the immigrants living there. Thus it was that the situation of immigrants and housing received important media coverage. Out of this crucible came the policies for the destruction of the bidonvilles and the relocation of their immigrant inhabitants to better dwellings. Between 1967 and 1970 familial immigration had risen to 25,000 families per annum. By 1970 the intake was 38,000 and 650,000 foreigners were still living in Bidonvilles. However the annual program for public housing for French and foreigners was fixed at 125,000 dwellings

⁸⁴ Except for La Ligue Communiste, which was legally dissolved by the Conseil des ministres due to contravention of a 1936 law prohibiting political parties from bearing arms. See Patrick Weil, *La France et ses Etrangers*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, p.75.

⁸⁵ Jeanette Money, *Fences and Neighbors*, Cornell University Press, 1999, pp.127-8. "But the regional specific pressure was even more clearly visible when, in 1969 and again in 1972 and 1974, the communist mayors of the Paris region issued statements condemning the concentration of immigrant workers in their neighborhoods. The 1969 declaration criticized the 'immigration policy designed to provide large capitalist companies a cheap workforce - to increase their profits - and to put pressure on the salaries of all workers'. After complaining of the forty-six thousand

individuals still living in 117 *bidonvilles*, the statement came to the crux of the problem: 'Essentially, immigrant workers are concentrated in communist municipalities. They seek social aid ... But their massive presence in these communities comes also from the fact that it is toward them that the government systematically directs the new immigrants. The result for our cities is the insupportable charges [on government services] for which solutions cannot be found at the local level'.

⁸⁶ Monique Hervo and Marie-ange Charras, *Bidonvilles*, Cahiers libres 219-220, Cahiers Libres 219-220, Librairie François Maspero, 1971, p.338, "Il est par exemple déclaré à l'intéressé que l'obtention d'un logement sera une contrepartie de son changement de nationalité. Beaucoup d'ailleurs représentants de la police, employeurs, ou même responsables sociaux, suggèrent ou conseillent nettement cette procédure, se faisant ainsi complices, consciemment ou non, de ce qu'on ne peut appeler qu'un « chantage », moralement intolérable. Il est alors certain que quelques-unes de ces familles, qui ne savent plus du tout vers qui se tourner pour avoir un logement, finissent, dans le plus grand découragement, par céder à ce genre de pression effectivement exercée sur un bon nombre d'entre elles. Mais, en général, les familles qui prennent la nationalité française dans le but exclusif d'obtenir par là leur relogement sont en nombre très limité (il arrive d'ailleurs qu'un seul de ses membres effectue le changement, en général la femme). Ces changements de nationalité sont très violemment désapprouvés par leurs compatriotes ..." In English the content of this quote is that the police, employers and even social workers placed pressure on immigrants to take on citizenship in exchange for housing. The authors condemn this as a morally intolerable exercise. They say that some families gave in to this pressure, often compromising by allowing the wife only to naturalise, and that generally immigrant communities in the *bidonvilles* strongly condemned selling out on citizenship.

⁸⁷ The annual report on public housing, 13 March 2000, of the Bishop Pierre Foundation (La Fondation Abbé Pierre), which is a caritas organization, was widely reported in the French press. The report blamed lack of housing on insufficient construction of new HLMs, i.e. low cost public housing. It said that because of this lack many families were living in squats and slums. According to the report something like five million people in France have more or less seriously substandard housing. The report contrasted a mood of economic optimism with worsening public housing scarcity. The situation was just as bad in the private sector, it said. Although more money was available from the State to assist people to pay for housing, access to these allowances had become increasingly complex and inequitable and this added to the problem of the real dearth of affordable housing.

Since 1993, the report continued, PLA's (Prêts locatifs aides) – assisted rental housing loans – had declined by 45%. For every 80,000 budgeted for, only 50,000 were actually financed and allocated. There were more and more crisis and temporary lodgings, but they were overwhelmed and did not fulfill their function of staging people prior to their accessing permanent lodging.

In addition, the report criticized national housing policy for being too slow to adapt to changing demands and accused local housing politics of racially discriminatory practices equivalent to a "form of apartheid." "[Foreigners] are twice as likely to live in HLMs and to have only 1.1 rooms per person, in contrast with 1.7 rooms for French people."

⁸⁸ Birrell & Birrell, *An Issue of People*, Second Edition, Longman Cheshire, 1987, p.46.

⁸⁹ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses Etrangers, l'Aventure d'une politique de l'immigration 1938-1991*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, p.38. An example of this is the treatment of Spanish refugees after the taking of Barcelona in January 1939. Despite the announcement that the frontiers were closed to republican refugees from the civil war, several hundred thousand were allowed to enter France. They were housed in inhumane conditions in refugee camps, despite public outcry. When many returned in the two years after hostilities, British and French governments attempted to obtain amnesty for them from General Franco. The French considered forced repatriation and it is possible that in April 1939 the police had received orders to forcibly repatriate. However protests from the French Left and a large part of the public, resistance from the refugees themselves and a degree of lack of cooperation from the Francoists themselves made this unviable. Eventually conditions in the refugee camps for those who would not return to Spain improved.

Page.40: On 12/4/1939 a decree was pronounced. In part inspired by the presence of Spanish refugees on French soil, it became possible to draft refugees into work teams or the French army. In the same year 80,000 Spanish soldiers were interned in France and 20,000 were sent to work in industry, 20,000 to the army and 39,000 to work in agriculture.

⁹⁰ Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, No.4886, 1989, p.15: The OMI was assigned the role of facilitating family reunion "*where appropriate lodgings are available*" as set out in a circular dated 20 January 1947. Also Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, , p.64. The terms have not changed substantially since the Decree of 29 April 1976. This decree did not apply to nationals from member states of the European Economic Community, or a few African States or to Algeria. In the case of Algeria, however, an addendum to an agreement signed on 27 December 1968 was signed on 22 December 1985 (and proclaimed on 7 March 1986) made conditions applying to Algerian nationals and family reunion almost identical to those applying to other non EEC immigrants. The law that is currently applicable for non EEC family reunion and which contains the same conditions is Article 11,

(no. 29 of L.no 93-1027 of 24 August 1993) of the French *Code Civil*. This law also requires that the foreigner has been resident in France for at least two years and is in possession of a resident's visa for at least one year's duration.

⁹¹ Weil p.63. The problem was almost comically circular. In 1945 the ONI assumed responsibility for transporting immigrants' families in exchange for a financial deposit, but the shortage of lodgings made bringing families impossible. The Minister for Finances also imposed stringent limits on sending money out of France. Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, Paris, 1989, p.75. Costa-Lascoux writes that the shape of immigration in France was largely determined by housing and urban housing politics.

⁹² Article 11, no.29, of the French *Code Civil*

⁹³ Needless to say there were the usual exceptions which are generally dependent on wealth, education and special skills.

⁹⁴ Regarding the right to family reunion: Dupâquier, Jaques, *Histoire de la population française, de 1914 à nos jours*, Presses Universitaires de France, Volume 4, 1st Edition, 1988 p.480-481 and *Encyclopaedie Universalis 3* (Electronic Version) "Droits de l'Homme" and "Convention Européene" and "Traité de Rome": For the notion of "human rights" is not just a philosophical one in the context of French law. France is party to international laws that over-ride national law on issues of Human Rights and these include The European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Basic Liberties, created by the European Council on 4 November 1950, effective from 3 September 1953 (but only ratified by France in 1973), The *European Social Charter 1961*, effective from 1965, and the *Act of Helsinki August 1975* (issuing from the *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1975*). France is also signatory to the *European Agreement on the Status of Immigrant Workers and their Families* (1977) and the *International Agreement on the Protection of the Rights of Immigrant Workers and their Families* (UN, 1978). All these agreements contain defenses of family reunion and are influential on France but the European Convention has teeth in the form of the Court of Human Rights and other juridical structures.

⁹⁵ See Note 89. There is also a requirement that income be sufficient for decent living and entry may be denied where public health or order might be negatively affected.

⁹⁶ Birrell & Birrell, *An Issue of People*, Second Edition, Longman Cheshire, 1987, pp 56-57. In Australia accommodation was used as a requirement for sponsorship of some immigrants (mostly Southern Europeans) in the 1950s. In 1957 the campaign of "Bring out a Briton" was launched, where Australians were encouraged to seek out jobs and accommodation for British migrants. Such requirements were however not encoded and these days money, employment and many other factors overshadow accommodation in sponsorship.

⁹⁷ This situation has been written about quite candidly by Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "Pour une ouverture selective des frontières", *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 20 June -5 July, 2000, p.83, from an interview by Isabelle Monnin. Wihtol de Wenden is a Director of Research at the National Centre for Scientific Studies (CNRS) and author of numerous academic works. Another source on this is Mark J Miller, "Employer Sanctions in France", US Commission of Immigration Reform, 2430 E Street, NW, South Building, Washington DC, 1995, p.10, 17, "Roughly one third of all legal infractions and complaints concern the building sector alone (p.18) This situation was alluded to in correspondence with sources mentioned in the note below and by Prof Francis Ronsin *Histoire Contemporaine*, Univ. Bourgogne in Dijon and author of *La Population de la France de 1789 à nos jours*, Seuil, 1977.

⁹⁸ For instance, at times of sudden heavy demand for building work, such as that generated by the unusual storm damage at the end of 1999, it is difficult to find the necessary skilled workers. Unsurprisingly, small building enterprises that are unable or unwilling to offer competitive conditions and wages suffer most from difficulty in attracting skilled workers. The need for rare skilled trades could arise especially where restoration of ancient buildings was required.

⁹⁹ For France: Extracts from the following articles were provided to me by Catherine Comet of the Confederation de l'artisanat et des petites entreprises du batiment (CAPEB) via Agnès Thibault: agnes.thibault@wanadoo.fr : INSEE, "Difficultés de recrutement insee 94-00", 2000, contains the results of monthly INSEE questionnaires to Heads of Enterprises concerning their recruitment problems. *CAPEB Cellule Etudes Economiques*, AT: "Les Problèmes de recrutement dans les entreprises artisanales du batiment" is an article that appeared in the monthly CAPEB journal (18/11/1999) on problems of recruitment in small building firms. It presents results of a study done in 1999 for CAPEB on problems of recruitment by small building firms. INSEE, "Principaux indicateurs conj 0900" presents the results of a study by INSEE on difficulties of recruitment in the building sector during the period 1994-2000. I also obtained assistance from Christine Salvat, salvat@apcm.fr of the Assemblée permanente des chambres de metiers (The permanent assembly of Chambers of Trades) <http://www.apcm.com/>. Replying to my request for information on the situation in France, in an email dated 28 Sept. 2000 suggested that keeping up the supply of apprenticeships is a permanent struggle, especially in regard to some outmoded or rarified trades, [which are of course in demand in the

widespread restoration of ancient buildings in France], however she did not believe that this had given rise to seeking foreign tradesmen (from outside the EEC) since there were many French eager to take up such training and there is a strong government initiative to attract people to train for these trades. There are indications that the industry is actually resistive to the employment of immigrants since part of the government initiative is to combat rejection for racial reasons as well as to encourage the employment of women in these areas. See the above site regarding this. It is also possible to obtain more information by doing a search under "artisan" on the site of the Ministry for Employment and Solidarity: <http://www.travail.gouv.fr> Under the *Code du Travail*, Chapitre II, S.2, Art 43, L.115-1; Art 44, L.118-2-2, Art. 45, L.118-2-3,4, L.119-1-1 etc. there are sections dealing with collection of money from employers to subsidise apprenticeship courses, although the State remains in control of these courses nationally as with all education, and undertakes much of their subsidy. The financing of apprenticeships is currently under review to maximize funding and support for students to make the system more effective in taking up unemployed persons in France.

For Australia: Birrell & Birrell, *An Issue of People*, Second Edition, Longman Cheshire, 1987, p.68.

¹⁰⁰ Birrell & Birrell, *An Issue of People*, Second Edition, Longman Cheshire, 1987, pp.67-68 and Terry Burke, Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 7, "The Land Development and House Building Industries," Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, p.22.

¹⁰¹ Birrell & Birrell, *An Issue of People*, Second Edition, Longman Cheshire, 1987, pp.67-68 and Terry Burke, Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 7, "The Land Development and House Building Industries," Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, p.22.

¹⁰² 1995 Encyclopaedia Universalis France S.A., "Logement (Politique du)" and Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages).

¹⁰³ French Population Data, from 1946-1990: Roselyne Kerjosse, Irène Tamby: "La situation démographique en 1994: mouvement de la population", Institut national des études économiques (INSEE) Paris, 1996, 264P.: carte, graph, Tableau; 30 cm, Tableau 3, "Evolution de la population totale depuis 1946, Evaluation fondée sur les résultats des recensements de 1946 à 1990." Data source for 1987-1997 was INSEE: "France Métropolitaine. Indicateurs démographiques 1987 à 1997"

Household formation and homebuilding finance: Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages), and Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, "The Australian and International Housing Systems", Module 2, Housing Studies, Swinburne University of Technology/NO79AS485/2/6/1999: "The European countries have had a much lower rate of household growth, and therefore housing demand, than Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States."

¹⁰⁴ In France the housing industry adapted by greater energy efficiency of housing design, by refurbishing old buildings and most of all by adapting to customer demand and factory construction with major pre-payments, rather than borrowing to build speculative estates. The Government also reduced its annual commitments to public housing construction. Inflation, which affected the public's ability to purchase houses caused many in the building industry to go broke. Sources: "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages). Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, p.18, which refers to the different systems in Europe and the English speaking settler countries, including Australia. On p.32 Burke comments that developers in Australia frequently employ a strategy of "inviting as many builders as possible to set up display houses. Some have up to 60 different builders working on their estate at any one time. This fragmentation not only limits the degree to which the builders can appropriate development gains, but also further restricts their ability to embark on more industrialised forms of production techniques that might occur on site." See also Gavin McCrone and Mark Stephens, *Housing Policy in Britain and Europe*, UCL Press, 1995, p.23, Chapter 3, "Housing Policy in France", "French housing policy has undergone considerable changes in recent years, but the process has been more evolutionary than the abrupt changes of direction that have characterised the UK. ... As in other countries, the impetus for many of the changes since the mid-1970s has been the need to contain costs and to target the measures more effectively...". See also Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages). This plots the course of the housing construction industry in France from WW2 and documents a number of industry and design adjustments to energy and financial strictures after the oil shock.

The French government subsidizes apprenticeships as it does all other education and this would have facilitated the capacity of the French industry to radically reappraise its mode of operation, technology and training needs. Much of the financing for apprenticeships comes from an employer tax for apprenticeships (*Code du travail* and Article L.118-2 and subclauses cited on <http://www.apcm.com/> which is the net address of the Assemblée permanente des chambres des métiers, consacré à l'artisanat, à l'apprentissage et à la formation (Permanent Assembly of Chambers of occupations, dedicated to trades, to apprenticeships and to training).

During the depressed period in housing in the mid-seventies in Australia private land developers wound back their release of land until demand returned - Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 7: "The Land development and House Building Industries", p.31 Note that this increased demand coincided with the return to high immigration. Other sources of Australian material on this period: Tom Uren, *Straight left*, Leonie Sandercock, *Land racket : the real costs of property speculation*, Paul Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*, Brian Buckley, *Lynched : the life of Sir Phillip Lynch, mastermind of the ambush that ended Gough's run*, Leonie Sandercock, *Property, politics, and urban planning : a history of Australian city planning, 1890-1990*, Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, 1972-1975*, Viking, 1985.

¹⁰⁵ Jeanette Money, in *Fences and Neighbours*, Cornell University Press, 1999, pp 167-168, refers to changes in representation in government committees and boards consulting on immigration and population as "the game of musical councils". She says that until the 1970s membership of the two post war councils, the Immigration Advisory Council and the Immigration Planning Council, was "drawn primarily from the growth lobby, a group of relatively powerful economic interests that profited from an expansion in the domestic market. These interests included the construction industry, land speculators and developers, farmers, manufacturers and retailers ... Whitlam adjusted membership of both these councils to reflect "preferences for advice from those that favored lowered intakes". Then he abolished the department of immigration and replaced these bodies with a new one, the Australian Population and Immigration Council (APIC). "The shift in nomenclature represented the changing perspective on immigration issues in society, from a focus on immigration to concern about population growth." When the Fraser government succeeded the Whitlam government, it changed the institutions and the advisors again.

¹⁰⁶ Which the Whitlam government had apparently anticipated prior to winning office, due to Rex Connor's knowledge of minerals, energy and mining. See, Rick Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning, The Story of Australia's Oil Industry*, David El Press, 1983, p. 138.

¹⁰⁷ Paul Ormerod, *The Death of Economics*, Faber and Faber, London, 1994, p.133-137. The experience of Great Britain and Norway was somewhat different due to their capacity to exploit the North Sea oil fields. (Note that further explanations for the economics and politics of energy policy during this period would require covering such contentious, varied, and complex material that even brief discussion is beyond the bounds of this paper.)

¹⁰⁸ See Jean-Marie Chevalier 1997 *Encyclopaedia Universalis*, France S.A., "Energie, Economie de l'" for a good synopsis of France's history as an energy poor economy and its nuclear development and technological adaptations post 1973 and BP Amoco Historical Download Excel file of 'World Oil consumption' 1966-1999, www.bp.com/worldenergy/xl/hxl/

¹⁰⁹ Weil, pp 79-80. (Note that the ban on worker immigration excepted family reunion, refugees, investors and other special cases.) Weil writes that the contradictions in the problem of immigration between divergent interests were increasing and harder to manage. Foreigners kept arriving to look for work in France, and some of them were wanted, but there seemed to be less and less need of them. Unemployment had risen since September 1973 and the closing of the borders of the other European States had had the effect of diverting increasing numbers of migrants to France.

¹¹⁰ From André Postel-Vinay, Minister responsible for Immigration from May 1974, in an interview in *Le Monde* 24/9/1974, cited by Weil in *La France et ses étrangers*, pp.83-84. Here is the original of the text translated above. "Le doublement de la population du tiers monde que l'on nous promet pour la fin du siècle, présente, à mon avis, des dangers considérables. [...] À moins que l'art et les techniques de développement ne réalisent des progrès d'une étonnante rapidité, à moins que l'esprit de solidarité ne se répande d'une manière imprévue, cette prolifération de l'espèce humaine aggraverait la misère et la sous-alimentation sur de vastes territoires ... "Rejeter, par principe, l'idée d'une interruption ou d'une limitation des entrées de nouveaux migrants, cela reviendrait à soutenir que nous devons laisser se développer l'immigration, même si elle contribue à l'accroissement du chômage et au peuplement des taudis. Ce n'est pas défendable [...]. Je n'ignore pas les aspects choquants de toute mesure d'interruption ou de limitation des entrées, le caractère inhumain de ces refoulements de la misère; mais cette misère hélas, risque d'affluer toujours davantage et d'arriver à des secteurs géographiques de plus en plus lointains : nous ne pouvons pas l'accueillir sans limites. Nous en périrons sans la soulager."

¹¹¹ Brian Buckley, *Lynched, The Life of Sir Phillip Lynch, Mastermind of the Ambush that Ended Gough's Run*, Salzburg Publishing Pty Ltd, Toorak, Victoria, 3142, p.34

¹¹² Paul Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*, Allen & Unwin, 1994, p. 191. The Governor General later signed the minutes of this meeting and those of a later one that reduced the loan sought two billion. Kelly and Tom Uren, (*Straight Left*, Vintage, 1995 pp. 209, 222, 223, 236-7), describe Rex Connor as having an impressive knowledge of

the mining industry. Apparently Gough Whitlam had no knowledge of the industry at all and was convinced that Connor was a visionary.

¹¹³ This event that has not been much studied to date by demographic sociologists. Jeanette Money, in *Fences and Neighbours*, Cornell University Press, 1999, p.197-198, comments on the lack of attention to the period in general.

¹¹⁴ There are many references for these innovations. As well as Whitlam's book, *The Whitlam Government, 1972-1975*, Viking, 1985, the chapters, "Health", "Women", "Migrants", "Cities", Siedlecky and Wyndham, *Populate and Perish, Australian Women's Fight for Birth Control*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990, p.136-137, detail his government's support for family planning, subsidising of the contraceptive pill and health rebates for abortions. References for comparison with French policy may be found in several sources, for instance, Patrick Weil, *La France et ses immigrés*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, pp 81-86 and 243-254.

¹¹⁵ Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, 1972-1975*, Viking, 1985, p.502. According to Robert Birrell & Tanya Birrell, *An Issue of People, Population and Australian Society*, Second Edition, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 1987, pp89 - 93 the Labor government's reduction in immigration was largely conceived as a measure to offset the impact of the rise in unemployment that the government expected would result temporarily from some massive cuts in protectionist tariffs for the manufacturing industry, however Whitlam's own statement contradicts this and the origins of this policy are dated to quite an early period, Rick Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning, The Story of Australia's Oil Industry*, David El Press, 1983, p. 138, "[Connor's] opening words left no doubt that he felt Australia was on the right path: "The national policy on minerals and energy approved at the 1971 Launceston Conference of our party has proved to be not only singularly relevant but even historically visionary in the light of subsequent events. We anticipated the world energy crisis (1973), have dealt with international currency turmoil, established a sound export pricing policy, checked the inroads into Australia of the multinational corporations, and secured the respect and understanding of our trading partners." P. 139, "There is little doubt that some of Connors's ideas were far-sighted. ... He was correct in predicting the 1973 oil crisis and then, at a time when people world wide had overcome the fright of the OPEC moves, Connor continued to champion conservation of energy. Unfortunately he was denied the mean of achieving it. ..."

¹¹⁶ 1997 Encyclopædia Universalis France S.A., (Electronic Version), "FRANCE - Données humaines et économiques -"La Vie industrielle" and Jaques Dupaquier, *Histoire de la population française, Vol.4, de 1914 à nos jours*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, p 202-203, 1997 Encyclopædia Universalis France S.A., (Electronic Version), "Sécurité sociale".

¹¹⁷ The politics of nuclear energy are more sensitive in Australia than in most places, but Australia has been laggardly in exploring many energy alternatives, especially non-fossil fuel alternatives. This must be related at least in part to the abundance of our fossil fuel reserves, of which possibly the largest is coal. See, Brian Fleay, Institute for Science and Technology Policy, Murdoch University, West Australia, *Beyond Oil: Transport and Fuel for the Future*, Paper downloadable in .pdf form from the University Website , <http://www.wistp.murdoch.edu.au/> or available from the above policy faculty and Rick Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning, The Story of Australia's Oil Industry*, David El Press, 1983 (last three chapters). There are quite strong rumours that Australia may promote liquefaction of coal as a fuel substitute, as well as oil bearing shales and sands. The pollution factors could be very serious. Coal can be turned into gasoline through the Fischer-Tropsch process. Environmentalist, Alan Parker writes, "The extra energy required to turn coal into oil will double the already high greenhouse gas emissions from transport. There has been a \$A 2 billion Japanese investment in a "brown coal to oil plant" in the Latrobe Valley in Victoria Australia. The plant has been mothballed until the price of oil goes sufficiently high. They have built a school for the workers children when they ultimately arrive. The same thing applies to Australian shale oil deposits in Queensland which are already in production. The need for a carbon tax will be crucial in just a few years from now." Alan A. Parker, Secretary to the Town and Country Planning Association (Vic) 50 Stirling Street, Footscray. Victoria, Australia, 3011, Email alanpar@ozemail.com.au, Telephone 03 9689 3693, Fax 03 9687 9519

¹¹⁸ Between 1977 and 1982 the Liberal-National Party government raised the immigration intake goals again, to 90,000 and then to 120,000. This seems to be about the point where immigration policy ceased to respond to unemployment levels by adjusting migration downwards, which had been a practice prevailing, to a greater or lesser degree, in previous governments. (Demographic Statistics, ABS, Cat no 3101.0. Figures for 1952 to 1977 are from J. Shu, S. E. Khoo, A. Struik and F. McKenzie, *Australia's Population Trends and Prospects 1993*, (BIR), AGPS, Canberra 1994.)

¹¹⁹ Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, «Le BTP depuis 1945», *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages), page 2-3

¹²⁰ Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, «Le BTP depuis 1945», *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages), page 2-3

¹²¹ Insee, *Données sociales*, 1993, Figure 4, "Logements terminés par secteur de construction de 1949 à 1977" p. 411 and Insee, *Annuaire rétrospectif de la France, 1948-1988*, Table 1, "Situation de la construction". Source for 1980-1994 was Maurice Blanc and Laurence Bertrand, "France", *Housing Policy in Europe*, Ed. Paul Balchin, Routledge, 1996, Table 9.2, p.127. (Figures for 1994 were provisional). Original sources: Ministère de l'Équipement, du logement, des transports et de la mer.

¹²² In 1967 "ZACs" (Zone d'aménagement concertés) came into being in France. Barry Simpson, *Planning and Public Transport in Great Britain, France and West Germany*, Longman, 1987, pp.73-74 describes these as if they were facilitators for private developers. A ZAC was a zone where considerable changes were envisaged over a short period of time under the *loi d'orientation foncière 1967*, which authorised public authority land requisitioning. With the ZACs such land was passed on to private developers, who were supposed to build schools and amenities in conformity with the needs of the future community. However the ZACs were full of tax loops and dodges and the developers were exempt from the general requirement for industry to contribute taxes for local infrastructure including internal roads, open space and parking. Burtenshaw, Bateman and Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley and Sons, 1981, write, pp 68-69 that there was "no established tradition of speculative office development prior to British involvement in the French property market. Indeed, in the mid-1960s, 80 per cent of new office space was for owner-occupancy. The situation changed rapidly in the 1970s, however, as British companies turned their attention to property development in Europe, and the balance in new office provision was reversed so that approximately 80 per cent of new office space was built speculatively. In much of Europe from the late 1960s onwards, British property companies became very active as promoters of new urban development. Their somewhat voracious methods were not always welcomed. In some cases, and notably in the case of Brussels, they were totally insensitive to the pre-existing urban fabric. In this case, controls were imposed somewhat belatedly to prevent further transformation of sensitive parts of the city." Burtenshaw, Bateman and Ashworth cite Goodall, B., *The Economics of Urban Areas*, Pergamon, Oxford, 1972, for an explanation of the rise of speculative office building .as mostly due to "the massive flow of funds available for property investment in the postwar period via insurance companies and pension funds. Further, the restrictions on the increasing of capital in post-war Britain could be circumvented by the so-called leaseback transaction. This enabled a company to sell its interest in a property, but to lease it back from the purchaser. In the process, the company raised much-needed capital and the purchaser, often an insurance company, had found in property a secure investment for part of its funds. Property companies themselves were often funded by insurance companies with pension funds. All of this activity meant that property, seen as an investment with a very high return, in comparison with other investment and the added advantage of being at that time virtually inflation-proof, was being actively developed."

¹²³ Australia's failure to adapt these new practices is explored in Terry Burke, Module 7 of *The Australian Housing System*, "The Land Development and House Building Industries", Housing Studies, Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/7/8/1999.

¹²⁴ Robert Birrell & Tanya Birrell, *An Issue of People, Population and Australian Society*, Second Edition, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 1987, p.68. In 1966 2.8% of overseas born males had degrees, compared with 2.4% of Australian born males. 16.5% of overseas born males had completed secondary school whilst only 7.8% of Australian born had.

¹²⁵ "The push of the group [Stone writes about], including the Australian Treasury, was for a reduction in assistance for housing generally and an opening up of the housing market to market forces unfettered by subsidies or regulated interest rates that artificially lower the cost of home ownership, raise ownership expectations, and encourage overconsumption of housing." Terry Burke, Peter W. Newton, and Mary Ann Wulff, "Australia", *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices*, Ed. Willem van Vliet, Greenwood, New York, 1990, pp 722-762: p.728 &732, citing Stone 1979.

I find it fascinating to know that the treasurer who prevailed over the treasury spoken of above, was the Phillip Lynch, who was sacked in 1977 for property speculation activities in an affair linked to corruption in the Victorian housing industry involving the Victorian Housing Commission. Lynch was also the person who alerted the Liberal opposition to the Khemlani loan and could thus be said to have initiated the events that led to the Whitlam government's downfall. Source: Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, 1972-1975*, Viking, 1985, pp390-391 and Brian Buckley, *Lynched, The Life of Sir Phillip Lynch, Mastermind of the Ambush that Ended Gough's Run*, Salzburg Publishing Pty Ltd, Toorak, Victoria, 3142, p.34

¹²⁶ Perhaps Australia sees its mineral wealth as a cash cow. The prospect of world energy shortages may not be feared by business so much as is perceived as likely to bring about concentrated benefits in trade. Perhaps the thought of profit overshadows attention to diffuse costs that will affect the general population as prices go up. (This will be the subject of further study by myself.)

¹²⁷ André Lebon, *Immigration et Présence Étrangère en France 1997/1998*, La Documentation Française, 1998, p.8.

¹²⁸ Mark J Miller, *Employer Sanctions in France*, A research paper from the University of Delaware in 1995, published by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 2430 E Street NW, South Building, Washington, DC 20037, 202-776-8400.

¹²⁹ In January 2000 an article issuing from the New York quarters of the United Nations received wide international coverage, particularly in the anglophone media. It canvassed a quite extraordinarily high immigration "solution" to Europe's aging population. Mr Joshep Chamie, Director, Population Division, United Nations, New York, NY, 10017, tel: (212) 9633179, Fax. 212 963 2147, was the spokesman for the press release, "Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to declining and Ageing Populations", 6 January, 2000 and for the final report, released on 22 March.

Many anglophone sources unquestioningly supported the UN study as a proposal, including *The Economist*, March 11, 2000 and Peter Ford, *The Christian Science Monitor* January 21, 2000, and (Reuters Press Release): "Ageing, shrinking populations face stark challenges UN population," by Robert Holloway, reported on Australian SBS 9.30PM News 21/3/00.,

The report was not much attended to in the French press, but where it was, it was greeted with some amazement. See Afsané Bassir Pour and Sylvain Cypel, "L'Europe aurait besoin de 159 millions d'immigrés d'ici à 2025", *Le Monde*, Thursday 6 January, 2000.

The reaction of the few French demographers who commented was to criticize its mathematics and to ridicule its concepts. See Henri Leridon, "Vieillesse démographique et migrations: quand les Nations unies veulent remplir le tonneau des Danaïdes...", *Population & Sociétés*, No. 358, Juin 2000 and Hervé Lebras "Les Mauvais calculs de l'ONU", *Rebonds*, 29 March 2000.

¹³⁰ At Prime Minister Jospin's request Jean-Michel Charpin, the Minister for Planning, oversaw a government enquiry into solutions for population aging and the result was *The Future of Our Pensions (L'Avenir de nos retraites)*, April 1999. This was available in July 2000 electronically from the French government website "La Documentation Française", <http://www.ladocfrancaise.gouv.fr/>. This is the French Government printer and publisher.

¹³¹ Thomas Malthus, *The Grounds for an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn*, John Murray, London, 1815 and Thomas Malthus, *An Enquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent*, John Murray, London, 1815, republished in *Pickering Masters: The Works of Thomas Robert Malthus: Essays in Political Economy*, William Pickering, London, 1986 Vol 7.

Malthus was primarily an economist and his works on profit and the corn laws (about importing versus self sufficiency, or, as we know it, liberal economics versus protectionism) compliment his demographic work. In his essay, *Grounds for an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn*, Malthus made the point strongly that it was only where profits were considerable on agricultural product, that agriculture would expand into marginal lands. (He linked expansion into marginal lands with eventual increases in production.) Where profit was low, the cost of extending agriculture was too high. Because of this relationship, farmers tended to concentrate production into the most high yielding areas of their properties. Malthus thought that it was desirable to encourage farmers to make more of their land productive. In his opinion, to get them to expand their productive area required some amount of protectionism and the encouragement of national self sufficiency, with government able to oversee the security of the production of staples.

Such a strategy was designed for the purpose of assuring a dependable market for agriculturalists, so that they would keep producing and expanding. Ensuring agricultural production meant that food and other necessities of life provided through agriculture would be available to citizens. Malthus was not against external trade or overseas expansion (which in those days included colonisation). The demographic part of his theory was that the population of a nation neither outstrip its food and staple resources nor become too numerous to be in a position to bargain for a living wage, nor too small to make farming too expensive for it to be worthwhile to landowners. The reason that staples should not be imported was that this might drive down prices for agricultural profit and thus cause a reduction in cultivated land. Then, if there was a war or the currency of a country fell in value, either of these things might make it impossible for the people of the nation to buy staples on an international market. If farmers had also stopped producing or increasingly restricted production to their best land, local supply could also become inadequate. This view suited early Australian settlers in an economy where Malthus's protectionist theories lacked the opposition provided in England by a strong industrial manufacturing sector. Protectionism dominated Australian agricultural and foreign policy from early times, and, until the 1980s or thereabouts, provided common ground for both labour and capital. Since the 1980s the Australian economy has become more liberalised and globalised.

In France (and Europe) the economy has maintained more malthusian characteristics than Australia's, particularly since 1974, in respect both to agricultural protectionism, energy self-sufficiency, and demographic stabilisation. French agriculturalists are of course famous for their lobbying to keep French pricing protective towards French agricultural production and consumption.

¹³² Christobel Young, *Australia's Aging Policy Options*, Bureau of Immigration Research, AGPS, Canberra, 1990.

¹³³ Neville Hicks, *This Sin and Scandal*, pp 88-89, note 30, cites the following populationist articles of that era:: J.G. Farleigh, 'President's Address' in NSW Chamber of Manufactures' *Annual Report* (1908), p 17 and J Barre Johnston,

'President's Address' in Sydney Chamber of Commerce: *Annual Report*, (1903), p 39; Report of the Council in NSW Chamber of Manufactures *Annual Report*, (1905), p 9; George Merrivale, 'Acting-President's Address' in Sydney Chamber of Commerce, *Annual Report*, (1906), p 31f; RJ Larking, 'President's Address' in Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, *Annual Report*, (1908), p 59; General council of Chambers of Commerce of the Commonwealth of Australia, *Report* (1907), p 47. In 1906 the acting President of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce enjoined, "an increase in population means an increase of wealth not only of the few but of the many." In 1908 the President of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce pushed for immigration on the grounds that suitable immigrants would be consumers as well as producers and should therefore be welcomed by all classes". In 1907 the General Council of Chambers of Commerce asked the government for a steady stream of immigration to provide for the "growth in industrial manufactures which will shortly exceed the volume of consumption of the present population". In 1908 the President of the New South Wales Chamber of Manufactures stated that: "...to get any benefits from increased protection they must get increased payment and that could not come from their own limited populations. A wisely managed scheme of immigration would be as much the saviour of the manufacturers as anything could be."

¹³⁴ Lenore Taylor, "Federal Government throws some carrots into pot of salty water", *Financial Review*, 11/10/2000, p.5. George Megalogenis, "Salt Tide Swamps Howard's Memory" Staff Reporters, "Premiers haggle over detail" (In a feature page on "The Fight Against Salinity"), *The Australian*, 11/10/2000, p.6.

¹³⁵ D.Burtenshaw, M.Bateman and G.J.Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, Toronto, 1981, p.ix.